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The 1966 Maryland gubernatorial election : the political saliency of open occupancy.

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THE 1966 MARYLAND GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION:
THE POLITICAL SALIENCY OF OPEN OCCUPANCY

A Thesis Presented

by

Michael S. Hatfield

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INTRODUCTION

It is hypothesized that the salient open occupancy issue accounted for much of the variance in electoral preference in the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election. We propose to validate this assertion by (1) establishing the existence of definite attitudes on integrated housing and political representation of such attitudes (2) verbal and quantitative analysis of candidates' campaigns and voter support in the primary and general election, and (3) analysis of the place occupied by the open occupancy issue in the campaign and the degree to which it determined electoral preference in this election. An aggregate evaluation of the election data by counties and economic areas, we feel, will permit a valid conclusion that this civil rights issue significantly affected voter preference.

One final note. Given the significance of the term "salient" in this presentation, we feel obliged to briefly inform the reader as to the context in which the term is utilized. In referring to an issue as salient, we imply that a particular concern is most prominent and relevant among groups of voters, relative to other topics. Brodbeck and Burdick, in American Voting Behavior, suggest that voters devote more "attention," "time," and "interest" to such issues. "Salient issues are connected with the success, survival,

purpose, or major goals of the group, and therefore the most political weight is attached to them."¹ So that we refer to this brief description by the above source in categorizing the term "salient" throughout this thesis.

¹Burdick & Brodbeck (ed.) American Voting Behavior, pgs. 170-171

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CHAPTER I

ATTITUDES ON INTEGRATED HOUSING

The purpose of Chapter One is to establish the potential salient and controversial nature of open occupancy. Analysis of this topic requires investigation as to whether (1) definite attitudes on integrated housing exist and (2) whether politicians correctly perceive such attitudes. Samples of both suburban and non-suburban attitudes are considered.

Where the initial investigation is concerned, it may be of assistance to briefly determine what suburbanites like about the suburbs, and by implication, why certain attitudes on open occupancy exist. Nina and Claude Gruen state that "the suburban resident has chosen his present location because it offers him the highest housing value for which he feels he wants to pay... this housing value includes (not only) physical shelter, space, and comfort, but a host of social, environmental, and public services that are attached to the suburban location he has chosen to live in."¹ This observation was supported by a Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission study, where suburban residents were asked to specify major factors influencing selection of their home. Thirty-four percent cited proximity to work, friends, school, or other institution; 32% mentioned factors associated with the social makeup of the neighborhood.² Familiarity with the neighborhood, the

prestige or exclusiveness of the area, and the type of people living at the location were the most frequently specified social factors.

In depth investigation of what suburbanites like about the suburbs would require a complex socio-economic analysis. At best, what we have presented is a surface evaluation of the subject. Yet an in-depth discussion of this particular topic is not our specific concern, but is only intended to serve as an introduction to definite suburban attitudes existent on open occupancy.

The Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission in 1970 investigated attitudes toward racial integration in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan Area³ (i.e., Dayton and its immediate suburbs). Respondent categories to the Commission's questionnaire on the desirability of integration were subgrouped into low income white families without a husband, low income white families with a husband, low income black families without a husband, low income black families with a husband, moderate income white families without a husband, moderate income white families with a husband, moderate income black families without a husband, and moderate income black families with a husband. (The sub-categories of "husband" and "no husband" have particular sociological implications as seen by the Commission, and are not especially relevant to our study of attitudes on open occupancy as a political issue.)

Where attitudes toward racial integration were concerned, both low and moderate income whites preferred segregation between the races, as reported by the findings of the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission; (figures recorded are 64% and 67% respectively). Low and moderate income whites (where no husband was present), preferred segregation by only 33%.

NOTE: The Commission reported that an integrated neighborhood was perceived, by husband-less white families, as more tolerant of such a household; hence, only a 33% rate of preferred segregation. Most significant, the mean average of whites that preferred segregation (i.e., low and moderate white families, with and without husbands), is 49.2%. Where low and moderate income blacks (with husband in the family) are concerned, 32% and 12% respectively, advocated segregation. Low income blacks, where no husband was present, advocated segregation in residential areas by 33%; moderate income blacks (where no husband was present), advocated integration by 100%. The mean average of blacks that prefer segregation and integration is 19.2% and 80.7% respectively. Very importantly, this analysis indicates the disparity between blacks and whites on attitudes toward the desirability of integration in housing (where whites favor integration by slightly over 50% and blacks by almost 81%. Segregation is favored by whites at a rate of 49.2%, and by blacks, 19.2%.

A second study conducted by the Miami Valley Regional Planning

Commission (MVRPC) investigated attitudes of suburbanites from four, varied SES-demographic backgrounds. "Suburban Area One"⁴ is a small city surrounded by farmland, outside the main metropolitan county. It has the lowest median family income of all four areas, and the lowest median house value. "Suburban Area Two" is geographically far from the city. It is a fairly prosperous and rapidly growing community, virtually all white, and desirous of maintaining a suburban, low density, residential environment. The population consists primarily of middle and working class households. "Suburban Area Three" is the richest of the four suburbs. It is an all white area, with the highest family income and house value. "Suburban Area Four" is a black suburban area attracted by well-to-do black families who can afford to move from the center of the city. So that the sample of suburban attitudes reflects this cross-section of varied backgrounds.

Yet the statistical findings compiled by the MVRPC do not reflect significant differences in attitudes, relative to the four sampled suburbs. Principal authors Nina and Claude Gruen, in analyzing the Commission's findings, state that "similarity of responses between the four areas was startling...averages (on attitudes toward integration) did not differ significantly."⁵

Investigation of suburban reactions to the migration of low and moderate income groups reveals (what can well be interpreted as) , a strong "racial bias" among suburban dwellers. Categories of potential migrants were divided into the following:

- a) low income elderly white
- b) low income elderly black
- c) low income physically handicapped white
- d) low income physically handicapped black
- e) low income white family with husband
- f) low income black family with husband
- g) low income white family without husband
- h) low income black family without husband
- i) moderate income white family with husband
- j) moderate income white family without husband
- k) moderate income black family with husband
- l) moderate income black family without husband

If racial bias were not a significant factor in the determination of suburbanite acceptance or rejection of migration into their neighborhoods, we would expect relatively similar types of reaction to the prospects of both low income black families with husband and low income white families with husband , as well as moderate income black families without husband and moderate income white families without husband , and low income white elderly acceptance or rejection to be similar to that of low income black elderly, etc. Yet where a hypothetical migration level was set at 5% (i.e., where the suburban resident was asked his reaction to 5% of the area being comprised of a particular group) , five of six black groups were rejected while one of six white groups was rejected. Authors Nina and Claude Gruen

report that, "...suburbanites show a strong racial bias: In almost every instance, the black household with husband (for example) was less acceptable than the white household without."⁶

[Average score definitions (reflecting responses of resident suburbanites) were formulated by the Commission where 1.00 to 2.49 indicated an acceptance of a given group; 2.50 to 3.50, a tolerant acceptance; 3.51 to 5.00, a rejection of particular group migration into the suburbs at the 5% level.]

No group received a score indicative of outright acceptance. However, the moderate income white family, with husband, received the highest neutral score (tolerant acceptance), of 3.07, and therefore was the most accepted group. Second, was the moderate income white family without husband (a neutral score of 3.19); third, the low income white elderly (a neutral score of 3.23); fourth, the moderate income black family with husband (the only black group receiving a neutral score--3.31); fifth, low income white physically handicapped (a neutral score of 3.33); sixth, the low income white family with husband (a neutral score of 3.46); seventh, the moderate income black family without husband (a negative score-rejection-of 3.53); eighth, the low income black elderly (a negative score of 3.55); ninth, the low income physically handicapped black (a negative score of 3.57); tenth, the low income white family without husband (3.64); eleventh, the low income black family with husband (a rejection rate of

3.67); and lastly, the low income black family without husband (a rejection rate of 3.91). So that a rank order of groups accepted (receiving neutral scores) and groups rejected (receiving negative scores), appears as follows:

<u>RANK ORDER GROUPS ACCEPTED</u>	<u>RANK ORDER GROUPS REJECTED</u>
1 moderate income whites (families with husbands)	12 low income blacks (families without husbands)
2 moderate income whites (families without husbands)	11 low income blacks (families with husbands)
3 low income white elderly	10 low income whites (families without husbands)
4 moderate income blacks (families with husbands)	9 low income blacks (physically handicapped)
5 low income whites (physically handicapped)	8 low income black elderly
6 low income whites (families with husbands)	7 moderate income blacks (families without husbands)

The aforementioned racial bias of suburban attitudes seems apparent in realizing that (a) while moderate income white families without husbands are accepted, their black counterparts, i.e., moderate income black families without husbands, are not; (b) while low income elderly whites are accepted, their black counterparts are not; (c) while low income physically handicapped whites are accepted, low income physically handicapped blacks are not; (d) while low income white families with husbands are accepted, low income blacks in this category are not accepted.

In order to further establish the validity of our assertion that racial bias appears to be evident among the responses given by suburbanites, where integrated housing is concerned, a study of group rejection rates,

holding "low income" (income less than \$5000) constant is proposed, followed by the utilization of the identical technique where moderate income groups are concerned. It is discovered, via the survey on attitudes of the suburbanite, that 55% of these respondents listed low income blacks as "among the least preferred" group where suburban migration was concerned; (note that this group consists of low income black families, with and without husbands, low income black elderly, and low income black physically handicapped). Thirty-one percent of these respondents listed low income whites as among the least preferred group where suburban migration was concerned. Nineteen percent of suburban residents named moderate income blacks as among the least preferred groups while 5% listed moderate income whites in this category. NOTE: Moderate income is \$5000 to \$10000.⁷ Nina and Claude Gruen make several comments which relate directly to our findings. "The survey brought into the open the...conflict between the middle class ideal that everyone is equally acceptable and the attitude that those who differ may be harmful to the middle class neighborhood."⁸ Mention of several respondents' comments on integrated housing lend support to the Gruen observation. Stated one suburban resident: "I don't want people who give all night parties or receive welfare checks living next door to me."⁹ A housewife in suburbia commented: "It would be beneficial for my daughter to live with all kinds of people as long as they had the same ideals and were

neat and clean."¹⁰ We suggest, very simply for the moment, that these types of suburban attitudes (indicated via the inflated rejection rates of lower and moderate income blacks, relative to whites in the identical category) have implications for the issue of open occupancy politically.

As a consequence of evaluating particular suburban attitudes on integrated housing, it appears essential to briefly suggest possible "reasons" for such attitudes. An educated assumption would be that reasons for these specific feelings are closely related to those factors (previously mentioned) that attract one to the suburbs; i.e., the presence of integrated housing may be perceived as a threat to the "prestige or exclusiveness of the neighborhood," and "housing value, in both the physical sense and in terms of social, environmental, and public services".¹¹ Indeed, a study of suburban respondents' reasons for considering low and moderate income households undesirable neighbors (and by implication, lower income blacks in particular given our previous analysis) appears to reflect a perceived need to protect stated attractions of suburbia. The Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission reports the below findings:¹² 55% perceived a drop in property values; 59% of suburban residents feared that migration by certain groups would result in a decrease in housing maintenance and general housing conditions; 43% envisioned a decrease in law and order; 40% indicated that the neighborhood would become less stable (i.e., a decrease in social status and neighborhood organization); 38% perceived a drop in quality of

schools and 36% envisioned an increase in property taxes due to the need for increased services. So that a rank order of "reasons" for considering low and moderate income groups undesirable neighbors, particularly the black lower income groups (as perceived by suburbanites) are:

- 1) decrease in housing maintenance
- 2) drop in property values
- 3) decrease in law and order
- 4) decrease in stability of neighborhood
- 5) drop in quality of schools
- 6) increase in property taxes due to need for increase in services

Heretofore, we have limited discussion of attitudes on integrated housing to the suburbs, primarily. A national study (of both suburbs and non-suburban areas) conducted by the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the National Research Council supports the findings of the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission. Five basic questions relating to attitudes on integrated housing were asked nationally of a white sample.¹³

- 1) ...tell me if you personally would or would not object to: having a black family as your next door neighbor

The question was submitted in August of 1966; 51% of the white sample indicated they would object to the entry of blacks into their neighborhood.

NOTE: 49.2% objected to integration (among whites) in the Dayton survey.

- 2) Would you move if black people came to live in great numbers in your neighborhood?

The question was submitted in July of 1966; 70% of the white sample indicated they would move in such a case.

3) White people have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods if they want, and blacks should respect that right.

The question was submitted in April of 1968; 54% of the white sample agreed with the above statement.

4) Would you favor a Federal law forbidding discrimination in housing against blacks?

The question was submitted in October of 1966; 51% of the white sample indicated they would oppose such a law.

5) In your own words, what is "open occupancy" -what does this term mean? NOTE: If the respondent's definition of open housing was fairly accurate (as judged by the surveyors), the additional question was asked: Would you like to see Congress pass or reject an open housing bill?

The question was submitted in April of 1967; 39% had a correct conception of open housing. Fifty-four percent of this group indicated that Congress should reject such a bill.

The above attitudes appear to reflect degrees of racial bias vis-a-vis the issue of housing (as noted by Nina and Claude Gruen).¹⁴ The study of the National Research Council indicates (a) a significant desire for segregated housing among whites (b) majority opposition, among whites, to open housing legislation.

Given the above conclusion, it is important to contrast white attitudes on integrated housing with black attitudes on the subject. While an exclusive evaluation of black opinion is not possible on the suburban level, given our sources, such an analysis on a national level (i.e., a

consideration of both suburban and non-suburban areas) is possible via the National Research Council study.¹⁵ Questions asked of the black sample were:

- 1) Would you personally prefer to live in a neighborhood with all blacks, mostly blacks, mostly whites, or a neighborhood that is mixed half and half?

The question submitted in the winter of 1968, 48% (five times greater than any other response except for "no difference") indicated a preference for "mixed half and half." NOTE: This opinion may be contrasted with questions one and two previously asked of the white sample. A half black, half white ratio, as suggested by blacks in answering the above question, could possibly be interpreted as the presence of blacks in "great numbers" as noted in question two where 70% of the white respondents indicated they would relocate in such a situation. The point is that conflicting opinions over the desirability of integrated housing apparently exist between the races.

- 2) An owner of property should not have to sell to blacks if he doesn't want to. (sample taken from blacks residing in Detroit)

The question was submitted in September, 1968; 54% of the black sample disagreed with this statement. (This opinion may be contrasted with question three submitted to white respondents, where 54% indicated that whites have a right to keep blacks out of their neighborhoods and that

blacks should respect that right.) Again, our purpose for comparison of attitudes is to stress the differing opinions of blacks and whites over the issue of housing.

3) Which do you think is more important now: to get more and better housing, in and around where blacks live already, or to open housing for blacks in other parts of the city and suburbs?

The question was submitted in September of 1968; 44% of the black sample indicated a preference for more and better housing yet a significant 41% stated that interracial housing was more important; 14% said both were "equally vital." NOTE: Clearly a majority of blacks favor, at least, open housing (41% plus 14%). This contrasts with the opinion of white respondents who oppose open housing legislation and presumably, open housing (given white attitudes on segregation). No direct question concerning federal legislation to assure integrated housing was asked of blacks in the National Research Council study. We make a major assumption here that since blacks favor open occupancy, they favor for the most part, legislation to enforce its prospects.

A major conclusion, then, is that definite racially related attitudes on integrated housing do exist. A study by the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission indicates significant preference for segregated housing among whites in the Dayton, Ohio Metropolitan Area. Via a second MVRPC survey, white suburban attitudes appear to be characterized by racial bias. Five

of six black groups studied were perceived as "undesirable neighbors" while five of six white groups were perceived as at least tolerable. On the national level, white attitudes were distinguished, also, by significant preference for segregated housing.

A survey of black opinion by the National Research Council indicated that a majority of this group favored open housing (but also favored programs designed to increase the quality and quantity of housing in black neighborhoods). So that definite, conflicting opinions on the desirability of integrated housing exist between blacks and whites.

Next, we want to investigate the attitudes and perceptions of politicians. The assertion is that these public officials correctly perceive the attitudes of their constituents and therefore are representative of such attitudes. If this assumption proves valid, conflicting views on integrated housing have the potential of being politically relevant (for the moment, such ambiguity will suffice). (The investigation of politicians' attitudes and perceptions relative to those of their constituents, and the ultimate representative nature of the former's behavior, is based upon the MVRPC suburban analysis.) We make a major, educated assumption that politicians' attitudes and perceptions vis-a-vis non-suburban whites and black constituents are likewise respectively representative.

The basis for the stated "educated assumption" is a study conducted by Miller and Stokes entitled Constituency Influence in Congress.¹⁶ The authors suggest that congressional representation of constituency is a mixture between the Burkean model (which places the congressman in the role of representing CONSTITUENT INTERESTS), the instructed-delegate model (where the congressman responds directly to the WILL OF THE CONSTITUENT), and the responsible party model (where a NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY overshadows the local electorate). Theoretically, the greatest degree of constituent "control" over the congressman is with the second of the three stated models. Given the Miller and Stokes study of three major issue areas, i.e., foreign affairs, social welfare, and civil rights, the latter issue category was found to be representative of the instructed-delegate model (the other two issue areas were found indicative of the other stated models).

Specifically, the representative's roll call behavior was most consistent with the constituency's attitudes (either due to an identical attitude by the congressman or the representative's correct perception of the electorate's attitude) on the issue of civil rights--as opposed to social welfare policy or foreign affairs. In an analysis which correlated constituency attitude with the representative's perception of that attitude, the rate of association was .63, compared to .19 and .17 for foreign affairs and social welfare policy respectively.

So that our previously stated educated assumption that politicians, in general, are representative of their constituents where open occupancy is the issue, is based upon the theme of the Miller and Stokes study. Yet in conclusion, utilization of this analysis makes another assumption; that the issue of open occupancy is a civil rights question.

In the study conducted by the MVRPC, politicians and public officials were surveyed from three of the four previously mentioned "Suburban Areas;" the black suburban region being excluded. Several basic findings emerge:¹⁷

- 1) politicians tended to represent the attitudes of their constituents rather than not
- 2) politicians' attitudes were not dependent upon their particular role in government or their jurisdiction
- 3) directly related to the initial finding, the majority of the public officials, whether elected or appointed, were knowledgeable concerning the attitudes and preferences of their constituents and the majority were willing to incorporate these desires into their policy and program formulations

Analysis of public officials' projections of their constituents reactions to low and moderate income households comprising less than 10% of their communities indicates the following: the moderate income white family with husband is perceived as most acceptable (67% of surveyed politicians believed that suburbanites would accept this group); second most acceptable, as perceived by public officials is the low income white elderly group (61%); third, the low income white physically handicapped (50%); fourth, the

moderate income black family with husband (42%); fifth, the moderate income white family without husband and the low income white family with husband (39% respectively); sixth, the low income black physically handicapped (18%); seventh, low income black family with husband (17%); eighth, the low income black elderly (11%); ninth, the low income white family without husband (10%); tenth, the moderate income black family without husband (6%); eleventh, the low income black family without husband (0%). A rank order comparison of politicians' projections of constituents' attitudes with actual attitudes of suburbanites is illustrated below:

PUBLIC OFFICIALS PROJECTIONS

- 1) moderate income white families with husband
- 2) low income white elderly
- 3) low income white physically handicapped
- 4) moderate income black families with husband
- 5) moderate income white families without husband
- 6) low income white families with husband
- 7) low income black physically handicapped
- 8) low income black families with husband
- 9) low income black elderly
- 10) low income white families without husband
- 11) moderate income black families without husband
- 12) low income black families without husband

ACTUAL SUBURBAN ATTITUDES

- 1) moderate income white families with husband
- 2) moderate income white families without husband
- 3) low income white elderly
- 4) moderate income black families with husband
- 5) low income white physically handicapped
- 6) low income white families with husband
- 7) moderate income black families without husband
- 8) low income black elderly
- 9) low income black physically handicapped
- 10) low income white families without husband
- 11) low income black families with husband
- 12) low income black families without husband

Of the six groups perceived as least acceptable by public officials, in anticipation of constituents' reactions, five such groups consisted of black individuals (i.e., low income physically handicapped blacks, low income black families, with and without husbands, moderate income blacks without husbands in the family, and low income black elderly). Likewise, of the six groups perceived as most acceptable by politicians, in anticipation of constituents' reactions, five of such groups consisted of white individuals (i.e., moderate income white families with husbands, low income white elderly, low income white physically handicapped, moderate income white families without husbands, and low income white families with husbands). THE IDENTICAL PATTERN PERSISTS WHERE ACTUAL SUBURBANITE ATTITUDES ARE CONCERNED. There appears to be definite racial (and also class) bias where suburban attitudes and perceptions by suburban politicians relate to integrated housing. Both blacks and the lower income categories are considered least desirable suburban neighbors. (By implication, the lower income black, all other variables negated, is the most unwelcomed into the suburban community. Further investigation illustrates the similarity between actual attitudes of suburbanites vis-a-vis integrated housing and the perceptions of the politician.) Concerning suburban attitudes, again, the black moderate income family with husband is the sole group receiving a neutral (interpreted as "tolerant") score; this same group

is perceived by suburban politicians as the most acceptable among black groups.

We indicated a bias against lower income groups (and blacks) in the suburbs. Where both the actual attitudes of the suburban dweller and perceptions of the politician in suburbia are studied, five of the six lowest rated groups (those groups rejected), were lower income groups. Four of these rejected, lower income groups consisted of black individuals. Our point is that the perceptions of politicians in relation to the acceptability of certain groups' movement into the suburbs, accurately reflects, what can be interpreted as, the racially and class biased attitudes of the suburban resident.

One final comparative analysis will lend support to this observation. The suburbanites' "reasons" for considering low income and black households as undesirable neighbors is contrasted with such factors as perceived by the politician. Close inspection indicates that of the six most "significant" reasons cited by suburbanites for labelling groups as undesirable, five such factors are perceived by the suburban politician. (Degree of significance is determined by percent suburban respondents and percent suburban politicians that cited particular reasons for the perception of groups as unacceptable.) These factors are:¹⁸

- 1) a drop in property values (50%)
- 2) race (50%)
- 3) decrease in quality of schools (47%)
- 4) increase in property taxes due to need for increased social services (28%)
- 5) decrease in law and order (28%)
- 6) decrease in housing maintenance (25%)

NOTE: See list of factors cited by the suburban resident

The sole, significant reason stated by suburbanites as a factor in citing certain groups undesirable, which was not recognized by the politician, was "the decrease in the stability of the neighborhood." Yet a key response from public officials (50%), indicating why particular groups might be unwelcomed in suburbia, was "race." This response is especially significant given the fact that the answer was not directly on the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission questionnaire but was a "write-in;" note that "race" was not a significant response category where suburbanites were concerned.

Analysis of the implications of "neighborhood stability" indicates a close similarity with race as a factor in labelling a group as an undesirable neighbor. The term, as authors Nina and Claude Gruen stated, implied the migration of (as one suburban dweller noted), "people that would be a bad influence on my family," and "people that would not fit in with the rest of the community."¹⁹ Given the "suburban bias," previously noted, the above statements appear to have possible racial implications. So that consensus is apparent between the suburban response of "neighborhood

stability" and the politicians' race response.

In conclusion, we have attempted to illustrate that suburban politicians correctly perceive, and represent the attitudes of their suburban constituents where integrated housing is concerned. When particular attitudes of the suburban dweller were investigated, definite patterns of bias against lower income and black individuals appeared to exist (again, the implications of racial bias are more important given the emphasis of our study on open occupancy-as opposed to class bias). A major assumption is made that non-suburban white and black politicians correctly perceive and represent the attitudes of their constituents as the suburban MVRPC study indicated of suburban politicians; to support this assumption we utilized the Miller and Stokes analysis.

In sum, these points emerge:

- 1) Suburbanites have definite attitudes on integrated housing as do white, non-suburban dwellers and blacks (the Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission study, analyzed by Nina and Claude Gruen and the National Research Council study indicate this). Suburbanites (by implication, white individuals), and non-suburban whites are reluctant to accept blacks into their neighborhoods.
- 2) Black attitudes, as indicated in the national survey by the National Research Council, express a desire for both an increase in the quality of

housing in black areas, and an increase in integrated housing.

3) Given our analyses and stated assumptions, politicians and public officials accurately perceive and represent the attitudes of their respective constituents.²⁰

So that the issue of integrated housing, given the existence of definite, conflicting attitudes by individuals, and the correct perception of those attitudes by politicians, is potentially, "politically salient;" i.e., the possibility exists that candidate (electoral) preference in a given election might be based upon such an issue. In this sense, the issue of open occupancy has political implications.

NOTE: In Chapter Five, reference is made to the criteria essential in order for an "issue" to be capable of possibly determining electoral preference. Our purpose here, again, is to establish the conflict in attitudes vis-a-vis open occupancy and to infer the potential of the issue's politically salient nature.

CHAPTER II

DISTRICT POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND REGIONAL ECONOMIC SKETCH

The purpose of Chapter Two is to acquaint the reader with the basic economic areas of Maryland, and to provide a brief political sketch of the state.

In order to facilitate an analysis of the former, a technique suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States is utilized.¹ The state's "economic areas" are comprised of: Western Maryland, Maryland Piedmont, Southern Maryland, Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, Maryland Eastern Shore Lower, the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, and the Maryland section of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area.

NOTE: The Bogue and Beale technique is used in Chapters Three and Four with respect to the analysis of candidate preference.

Western Maryland, consisting of Allegany and Garrett counties ranks sixth in area population (104,589) of the state's seven regions, with much of its inhabitants concentrated around the third largest city, Cumberland (pop. 33,415). Manufacturing (synthetic fibres, paper products, steel, railroad equipment), farming (mostly dairying and beef cattle), and coal mining are leading economic activities. Because of its particular industrial

products, the strong competition in coal mining with nearby Pennsylvania and West Virginia, and the region's greater-than-usual involvement in rail transportation (handling freight destined for the Baltimore Metropolitan Area in particular), this area has been typically one of the first to experience layoffs during business recessions. Western Maryland is 63% blue collar, 73% rural, less than 1% black, 3% foreign stock, with a median income of \$7000 and a median educational level of 10.4 years.

Maryland Piedmont, consisting of Carroll, Frederick, Harford, Howard, and Washington counties ranks third in area population (328,808) of the state's economic regions, with much of its inhabitants concentrated around the cities of Hagerstown (pop. 36,660) and Frederick (pop. 21,744).

In contrast with Southern and Eastern Shore Maryland, Maryland Piedmont is more Northern than Southern in its economic and cultural orientation, although the population is largely rural. Manufacturing is a larger source of employment than is agriculture with many industries located in rural districts. Significant numbers of inhabitants in Maryland Piedmont commute to jobs in Hagerstown, Frederick, or nearby parts of the Baltimore and Washington Metropolitan areas. Federal employment, especially in military installations such as the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, is an important and expanding source of work. Railroad employment is an important but diminishing source of employment, while economic emphasis is on dairying

directed toward nearby urban markets. The region is also characterized by some commercial fruit growing in the northward extension of the Shenandoah Valley.

Maryland Piedmont is 55% blue collar, 66% rural, 5% black, 6% foreign stock, with a median income of \$10,554 and a median educational level of 11 years.

Southern Maryland, consisting of Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's counties, is economically and culturally Southern. Slavery was fully developed in this region and only within recent decades has the white population exceeded the black. For 300 years the culture and economy of the region have been based on tobacco. "Southern Maryland is probably the only section in the country where the main support of the economy in colonial times is still the main support today."²

Until 1960, this region was totally rural. The single urban setting had slightly over 7000 persons. The region's population has increased over the past decade (35% increase in population), since it has become a rural residential district for some who work in the adjacent metropolitan areas in Baltimore and Washington. The area, however, ranks last in population (87,313) of the state's seven economic regions. In addition, Southern Maryland is 88% rural, 52% blue collar, 29% black, 5% foreign stock, with a median income of \$9128 and a median educational level of 11 years.

Maryland Eastern Shore Upper, consisting of Caroline, Cecil, Kent, Queen Annes, and Talbot counties, is also culturally Southern, having been a slave-holding region before the Civil War. The region ranks fifth in population (121,498), and is agriculturally oriented toward staple crops such as wheat and corn. In the last thirty years this region has shifted from cash grain into dairying because of a change in the relative profitability of the two types of farming. The dairy farm is now the most numerous type of farm. However, grain farming remains a supplementary source of income for dairymen.

Tenancy rates are much higher among commercial farmers in the Upper Eastern Shore relative to other areas in the state. The practice of renting farms is particularly common among dairy, grain, and general farmers. NOTE: Poultry farming, typical of Maryland Lower Eastern Shore, with its smaller average investment in land and equipment, is usually the enterprise of a farmer who owns his land in the state. Other economic activities in the Upper Eastern Shore include a substantial stake in Chesapeake Bay fisheries and limited manufacturing concentrated in the northeasternmost extension that lies along the Baltimore-Wilmington transportation axis.

The area is 66% blue collar, 21% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock; the median income is \$8078 and the median educational level, 10 years. The

region has no places of 10,000 inhabitants or more. NOTE: Bogue and Beale set a figure of 10,000 as indicative of significant concentration or urban population.³

Maryland Eastern Shore Lower, consisting of Dorchester, Somerset, Wicomico, and Worcester counties (ranking fourth in population: 122,072), is also culturally Southern. Not only was this region slave-holding at one time, but recently (in the mid-sixties), the city of Cambridge in Dorchester County, was the scene of violence between civil rights activists and staunch segregationists.

Economically, this region is fairly urbanized. Both the cities of Cambridge and Salisbury (pop. 12,239 and 16,302 respectively), are responsible for the processing of food products. In fact, the major source of industrial employment are the canneries and packing houses that process vegetables, seafood, and poultry. Sandy soils are abundant in the region so that an extensive truck and poultry agriculture has developed (as opposed to the dairy farming of the Upper Eastern Shore). In addition, the Chesapeake Bay, very rich in seafood, has provided for a most profitable commercial business.

The standard of living of farm operators in this region is fair. The types of farming practiced, however, require large numbers of farm laborers, both local and migratory, and among these people income levels

are low. Although fishing is important in the economy, it does not generally provide good reliable income. In addition, the industrial jobs available have not been sufficient to absorb fully the natural population increase. The region is 67% blue collar, 31% black, 75% rural, 3% foreign stock; the median income is \$7441 and the median educational level is 9.6 years.

The Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area ranks first in population of the state's seven regions (1,638,086) and contains eight places inhabited by at least twenty thousand persons. Note that the area contains Anne Arundel and Baltimore counties, and Baltimore City.

Baltimore City is Southern in cultural background but has acquired a degree of heavy industry and foreign immigration which make this particular background extremely marginal. The city's trade is mostly foreign with import tonnage predominating while the major industries process imported raw material. Such processing includes copper, sugar, steel (the area's largest employer) and gypsum. Another major port-related industry is shipbuilding and repair.

The rural portions of this region are characterized by livestock, dairy, and poultry farming, similar to Maryland Piedmont and the Lower Eastern Shore. The area, in total, is 86% urban, 22% black, 11% foreign stock, 47% blue collar, with a median income level of \$10,791 and a median educational level of 11 years.

The Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area ranks second in population of the state's various regions (698,323) and contains ten places of 10,000 inhabitants or more (indicating concentration of urbanization). Note that the region consists of Montgomery and Prince Georges counties. The area is the personification of suburbia, whose growth has been directly linked with that of Washington, D.C., and its many federal employees.

In general, families located in the area have been of the upper middle and upper class income brackets while a 97.7% rate increase in population has occurred. The region is 91% urban, 13% black, 17% foreign stock, 28% blue collar with a median income level of \$14,580 and the median educational level, 14 years.

The second-stated purpose of this chapter is to provide a "political sketch" of the state. In pursuit of this endeavor, we utilize political background information compiled in the Almanac of American Politics.⁴

"Maryland 1" (the First Congressional District), is comprised of the Eastern Shore and much of the western shore of the Chesapeake Bay; this district corresponds to those counties in Maryland Eastern Shore, "Upper" and "Lower," and two of three counties in Southern Maryland (Calvert and St. Mary's counties). As indicated in our economic analysis, the Eastern Shore was the scene of significant resistance to civil rights activity in the mid-sixties, the district having voted 22% for the Wallace candidacy in 1968

(compared to a statewide average of 14%). However, the western shore counties in Maryland 1 are more conventionally conservative. NOTE: See economic analysis of Southern Maryland.

The First District, in the sixties, was represented by conservative Republican Rogers C.B. Morton, though the area traditionally elects conservative Democrats into office. NOTE: Throughout our political analysis of the state's congressional districts, congressmen referred to were those in office during the 1966 gubernatorial election year. Indicative of the district's orientation toward civil rights policy was Morton's vote against the Civil Rights Act of 1966 (providing for guarantees of nondiscriminatory selection of federal and state jurors, and authorization for the Attorney General to initiate desegregation suits with regard to public schools and accommodations). The Congressman also voted against Title IV of the Civil Rights Act (a provision voted upon separately by the House), which generally provided for nondiscriminatory practices in the selling and renting of housing.

Redistricting altered the district to the Democrats' advantage recently, adding more marginal, rural and suburban territory. The over-all affect of this change was to increase conservative dominance in the area.

"Maryland 2" (the Second Congressional District) comprises the greater portion of suburban Baltimore County and Harford County to the

east (the district corresponds with the "economic areas" of Maryland Piedmont in part, and segments of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area). Baltimore County, 97% white, is composed of numerous "comfortable WASPy suburbs," like Towson, north of the city, and industrial suburbs of Dundalk and Sparrows Point between Baltimore City and the Chesapeake Bay.⁵

The Second District was registered a pronounced conservatism, voting against Humphrey in 1968, and demonstrating the presence of the late sixties' "white backlash" phenomenon (especially in Dundalk and Sparrows Point) cast significant support for George Wallace. The district, in 1970, was to also vote against Democratic Senatorial Candidate, Joseph Tydings--a Kennedy style liberal.

As a rough indication of the district's political orientation, Democratic Congressman Clarence Long voted against the "Philadelphia Plan" in 1969 (which would have required the hiring of a certain percentage of minorities on construction projects funded by the federal government), against the welfare-reform-oriented "Family Assistance Plan" (which would have provided a guaranteed annual income of \$1600 for qualified families), and for the "Work-Stamps" provision (which would require an individual to accept any offer of any job as a condition to receiving food stamps).

The Representative's association with the political arm of the AFL-CIO (the Committee on Political Education) and his general pro-labor policies,

have led some to label Mr. Long as a "domestic liberal."⁶ NOTE: In a study conducted by Barone, Ujifusa, and Matthews, the Congressman's roll call vote was in agreement with COPE official policy on 87% of the issues before the House.⁷ No doubt the Congressman's labor policies were a direct result of his constituency in Dundalk and Sparrows Point, the heavily blue-collar areas.

Despite this stated district's observed conservatism, as judged by the region's past voting record, Mr. Long supported the 1966 Civil Rights Act, and voted for the open housing provision of Title IV.

"Maryland 3" (the Third Congressional District), is the southern and eastern portions of the city of Baltimore and part of Anne Arundel County between Baltimore and Annapolis. The district corresponds to the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, cited in the economic area analysis. Maryland 3 contains a mixture of blacks from central Baltimore, white blue-collar workers from east Baltimore, and a few relatively affluent and conservative suburbanites from Anne Arundel County. Since three-quarters of the 3rd's residents live within the city, the district has been traditionally Democratic. The district voted 20% for Wallace in 1968 (compared to a statewide, eight district mean of 14%). The support for Wallace was most significant in white, blue-collar populated east Baltimore.

Democrat Edward Garmatz, the 3rd's Congressman, was considered a liberal on domestic issues due to his pro-labor policies and general associa-

tion with COPE. NOTE: Garmatz, in roll call analysis, was in agreement with official COPE policy on 96% of the issues before vote in the House. In addition, selection of three random issues upon which a perceived "liberal" or "conservative" position could be taken, indicates that the Representative voted "liberal", i.e., in favor of the aforementioned Philadelphia Plan, for the Family Assistance Plan, and against the Work-Stamp provision.

Nevertheless, despite this "domestic liberalism," Garmatz voted against the 1966 Civil Rights Act and against Title IV. Such behavior would seem to be representative of constituency in east Baltimore and Anne Arundel County in particular.

"Maryland 4" (the Fourth Congressional District), comprises the central and northeast portions of the city of Baltimore and a small part of suburban Baltimore County; this district corresponds to the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area in our economic area analysis. Within the district are the prosperous, all-white outskirts of the city, yet a growing proportion of blacks have been migrating. The 4th, with many of its residents descendants of Irish, Italian, and Greek immigrants, all of whom are determined to "protect their neat and comfortable homes from outsiders,"⁸ is the most middle class, most conservative, and least Democratic of the three congressional districts within Baltimore City (other such districts are the Third and Seventh).

Democratic Congressman George Fallon, the district's representative, was considered a liberal on domestic issues. This description appears to be supported by the Congressman's pro-vote on the Family Assistance Plan. However, where the 1966 Civil Rights Bill and Title IV of the bill were concerned, Mr. Fallon registered a vote against the proposed legislation.

"Maryland 5" (the Fifth Congressional District), is comprised of Prince Georges County (corresponding to the Washington Standard Metropolitan Area) and Charles County (corresponding to Southern Maryland). Wealthy, white-collar oriented Prince Georges County, with many of its residents employed by the federal government-although not to the extent of neighboring Montgomery County- is Democratic by a 2 to 1 margin. Yet in recent statewide elections, the county's residents, "still upward-striving and insecure,"⁹ have found the conservative position on law and order most attractive. Later, in 1970, Senator Joseph Tydings, the previously mentioned liberal, was to carry this county by only 54%.

Charles County, given to the Southern economic and cultural tradition, as was mentioned, has followed a rurally conservative political pattern. The county voted 26% for the Wallace candidacy in 1968 (compared to a statewide figure of 14%). The economic, cultural, and political orientations of these two counties, comprising Maryland's Fifth, indeed represent an unusual contrast. NOTE: 26% support for Wallace in Charles County was the

third largest percentage of votes received by the candidate of the state's twenty-two counties.

The 5th's congressman was conservative Democrat Hervey Machen who was to be ousted in 1968 by conservative, law and order candidate, Republican Lawrence Hogan, an ex-FBI agent; (Machen voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1966 and against Title IV of the bill). Hogan's victory over Machen appeared to reflect an attraction for the former's law and order campaign while the conservative Democrat seemed to fall victim to the fact that "he thought he had the district safely put away."¹⁰ Most significant is that the defeat of Machen did not demonstrate a weakening of conservative ideology in the Fifth District since Hogan, in 1970, was to crush an outspoken liberal Democrat with 62% of the vote.

In addition, indicative of the district's political ideology, analysis of the Republican's roll call behavior indicates agreement with the liberal, social welfare oriented "Americans for Democratic Action" on only 22% of issues voted upon; 25% agreement with COPE (this has implications for the Congressman's, generally, anti-labor policies); but 56% agreement with the conservative, anti-social welfare oriented "Americans for Constitutional Action." Yet Mr. Hogan is on record as voting for the Philadelphia Plan and for Family Assistance.

So that Maryland 5 politically, appears to reflect a mixture of mostly conservative (especially with regard to law and order), usually Democratic Prince Georges County, where close proximity to Washington, D.C.'s federal bureaucracy has accounted for traces of liberalism, and rural Charles County, whose great attraction for George Wallace is indicative of the county's Southern, conservative tradition.

"Maryland 6" (the Sixth Congressional District), is the western pan-handle of the state, extending from the Appalachian Mountains around Cumberland to the suburban reaches of greater Baltimore and Washington; the district corresponds to Western Maryland and portions of Maryland Piedmont in our economic analysis. The district, though once accurately characterized as conservative and Republican, appeared in the sixties as more Republican than conservative. In 1966, the 6th district was represented by liberal Republican Charles Mathias Jr., who had served the region since 1960. Brief analysis of the Republican's vote on selected issues indicates a liberal political orientation. In addition to supporting the Philadelphia Plan, the Congressman voted for the Civil Rights Act of 1966 as well as Title IV. Analysis of roll call record demonstrates that Mr. Mathias agreed with the official policy taken by the liberal Americans for Democratic Action on 78% of the issues before vote; an 83% agreement rate with COPE; and only an 11% agreement rate with the conservative Americans for Constitutional Action.

"Maryland 7" (the Seventh Congressional District) , includes most of west Baltimore , as well as a substantial portion of suburban Baltimore County . The 7th is the heartland of the city's large Jewish population which is steadily moving out into the suburbs . Blacks are now a majority in the city portion of the 7th , but are a minority district-wide , since the suburbs are almost entirely white .

From 1952 to 1970, the district, a perennial Democratic stronghold, was represented by Samuel Friedel, a loyal supporter of the Baltimore City Democratic organization.¹¹ NOTE: The district, since the immediate post WW II period , has consistently voted Democratic with the exception of 1966 (the gubernatorial race) , when Republican Spiro Agnew defeated Democratic, anti-open housing candidate George Mahoney.¹² Friedel, considered to be a liberal domestically, is on record as voting for the Philadelphia Plan, for the 1966 Civil Rights Act, and for Title IV of the 1966 Act. In 1970, the 7th district was to elect black Congressman Parren Mitchell into office, reflecting the increased percentage of blacks in the area. This change in the composition of the 7th's population was a trend that first became massive during Friedel's latter years in office, dating back to the mid-sixties .

"Maryland 8" (the Eighth Congressional District) , is liberal , upper middle class to upper class Montgomery County where many residents are employed by the federal bureaucracy . NOTE: See the economic analysis of the Washington , D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area for a description of pertinent SES factors . The eighth is also comprised of small portions of more conservative Howard and Anne Arundel counties to the north and east .

As befits a district dominated by the socio-economic characteristics of Montgomery County , both the local Democratic and Republican parties are the most liberal in the state . Since 1966 , the district has been represented by Gilbert Gude , an anti-war Republican who has an agreement rate with the Americans for Democratic Action , higher than that of many Maryland Democrats (74%) . The Congressman's rate of agreement with COPE on major issues before vote in the House is 83% , and only 25% with respect to the Americans for Constitutional Action . The Representative , further indicating a liberal orientation on domestic issues , voted for the Philadelphia Plan , for the Family Assistance Plan , against the Work-Stamp provision and for the 1966 Civil Rights Act . Despite this "across-the-board" liberal record , however , Congressman Gude voted against the open housing provision (Title IV) , of the Civil Rights Act . One final note is that the 8th District supported the Wallace candidacy in 1968 , by only 8% , the least amount of

support registered for the Alabama governor of the state's eight congressional districts.

In conclusion, our purpose here has been to brief the reader on basic economic and political characteristics of Maryland. By investigation of the state's economic areas, i.e., each region's occupational foundation, racial and ethnic composition, and other pertinent data, we have an admittedly "rough indication" of electoral behavior given a particular issue. The generalized nature of our conclusion based upon economic area analysis is emphasized.

In investigation of Maryland's congressional districts, we are presented with the opportunity to make an educated guess about a particular election based upon knowledge of district political ideology and background. In addition, although the terms by which congressmen have been labelled, i.e. "liberal," "conservative," are admittedly ambiguous (as are the implications of a vote on the Philadelphia Plan, Family Assistance Plan, or Work-Stamp provision), such techniques do allow the reader to become acquainted with the general ideological orientations of each district in the state. The generalized nature of our conclusion, based upon a description of political background is also emphasized.

Most significant, departing from the pattern of generalized conclusions, knowledge of each representative's vote on the Civil Rights Act of 1966, specifically the Title IV open occupancy provision, permits a relatively accurate ability to "predict" electoral behavior, given the 1966 gubernatorial election. If the thesis of Miller and Stokes cited in Chapter One is accepted, i.e., if congressmen do represent constituency attitudes on civil rights issues, then roll call vote on Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights Act should serve as an accurate indicator of district electoral behavior given an election where open occupancy is the key issue. Before examination of this "conclusion-based hypothesis," one major, technical problem must first be addressed.

Since our concern deals with permitting both educated assumption and accurate prediction vis-a-vis a gubernatorial election (especially from analysis of the Title IV provision), to facilitate the purpose of this chapter, the aforementioned "congressional district" must be transposed into the county-oriented discussion of Maryland's "economic areas." So that keeping in mind the political backgrounds of the respective districts, the transposition appears as thus:

FIRST CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: "Upper" and "Lower Eastern Shore; two of three counties in Southern Maryland; southern Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

Counties: Cecil, Kent, Queen Annes, Caroline, Dorchester, Wicomico, Worcester, Somerset, St. Mary's, Calvert, east and southern Anne Arundel

SECOND CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area; smaller portion of Maryland Piedmont

Counties: Baltimore County, Harford County

THIRD CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

Counties: northern Anne Arundel County, southern and eastern Baltimore City

FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

Counties: central and northern Baltimore City; small portion of southeastern Baltimore County

FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: southern portion of Washington, D. C. Standard Metropolitan Area and the western-most portion of Southern Maryland

Counties: Prince Georges and Charles counties

SIXTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: Western Maryland and Piedmont Maryland (except for Harford County and southern Howard County)

Counties: Garrett, Allegany, Washington, Frederick, Carroll counties, northern Howard County

SEVENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

Counties: northern Baltimore City; small portion of southwest Baltimore County

EIGHTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT

Economic Areas: northern portion of the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area; small portion of Maryland Piedmont; small portion of Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area

Counties: Montgomery County, southern Howard County, western Anne Arundel County

Given this transposition, we earlier stated that congressmen from the First, Third, and Fourth Districts voted against the Title IV provision of the 1966 Civil Rights Act. A preview of electoral behavior in the 1966 gubernatorial race demonstrates that the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area (corresponding to districts Three and Four), cast majority support for the Democratic, anti-open occupancy candidate George Mahoney. In addition, both "Upper" and "Lower" Eastern Shore Maryland (corresponding to the First District), voted for the Democrat, Mahoney. Simultaneously, Western Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (corresponding to the Sixth District in which Representative Mathias cast support for Title IV), voted for Republican Agnew in the gubernatorial race, the perceived liberal on open occupancy. So that knowledge of district orientation toward the Title IV provision of the 1966 Civil Rights Act enables us to easily predict electoral

behavior in corresponding economic areas relative to the 1966 governor's race, given the issue of open occupancy.

Ability to predict electoral behavior given knowledge of roll call vote on Title IV in the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Districts is somewhat more limited. Congressmen in both the Second and Seventh Districts voted for the Title IV provision despite the fact that a preview of 1966 election results indicates that the districts' corresponding economic area, the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, voted for anti-open housing candidate Mahoney. In all probability, it is the affect of the Maryland Piedmont constituency (which comprises a portion of the Second District), that accounted for Congressman Long's vote in favor of Title IV. Where the Seventh District is concerned, even though located in an economic area supportive of the anti-open housing candidate, the large population of blacks and Jews probably accounted for Congressman Friedel's affirmative vote on open occupancy.

Concerning the Fifth District (corresponding to the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan economic area and a portion of Southern Maryland), the vote against Title IV of the 1966 bill appears to be a direct influence of the mixture between rurally conservative Southern Maryland and a less than "totally liberal" Prince Georges County. NOTE: We previously mentioned that Prince Georges County, one of two counties in the liberal Washington,

D. C. suburban area, is not liberal on domestic issues to the degree of its neighbor, Montgomery County. This was indicated in analysis of the Fifth and Eighth Congressional Districts.

The Eighth Congressional District (corresponding to the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area; specifically Montgomery County and portions of Howard County and Anne Arundel County), illustrates our inability to predict the electoral behavior of the state's economic areas from knowledge of district vote on Title IV, with total accuracy. Given the dominant existence of Montgomery County, with respect to the Eighth Congressional District (as opposed to the Fifth District where there appeared no dominance but an ideological mixture between Prince Georges County and Southern oriented Charles County), we would expect an affirmative vote by Congressman Gude on Title IV. Such an expectation is enhanced by subsequent electoral behavior which saw the county heavily reject the anti-open housing candidate, George Mahoney in the 1966 governor's election.

If our analysis appears somewhat complex, we can sum up the purpose and conclusion of this chapter in the following manner:

- 1) generally, to acquaint the reader with Maryland's economic areas, thus permitting "educated assumptions" relative to electoral behavior given an issue (s)
- 2) generally, to familiarize the reader with the state's political background, thus enabling an "educated assumption" about electoral behavior given an issue (s)

3) specifically , to enable one to predict with accuracy , electoral behavior in the 1966 gubernatorial election , where open occupancy was the key issue , given knowledge of district vote on the open occupancy provision to the Civil Rights Act of 1966 (Title IV)

Such a prediction was possible where four of the state's eight districts were concerned . We attempted to give an explanation as to why electoral behavior could not be accurately predicted in the governor's race (by economic area) , simply from knowledge of the district's vote on Title IV where such predictions were found not to be possible . NOTE: The technique of predicting electoral behavior in the 1966 gubernatorial election from knowledge of congressional vote on Title IV of the 1966 Civil Rights Bill is chronologically valid since the open housing provision was voted upon by the House in August , three months before the election .

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CHAPTER III

THE DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY

The hope of Governor Millard Tawes that the Democratic party could unite under the middle-of-the road banner of Attorney General Thomas Finan appeared to be challenged early by the expression of U.S. Senator Joseph Tydings who openly doubted that the party "can avoid a factional fight in the primary."¹ Finan, with support of the state's established political organizations, ran on his record as attorney general. Carlton Sickles, congressman-at-large and supported by Tydings, assumed the reformer's role to put integrity back into state government. George Mahoney, "for nearly two decades a political spectacular but unsuccessful candidate, again dismissed by the political unwary," based his campaign against enforced open occupancy.² Clarence Miles, attorney and banker, proposed changes within the tax system and advocated a general policy of government thrift.

The 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary can be analyzed in terms of six major issues addressed by the candidates and their selection of campaign strategy. Positions on the issues of tax reform, increased state aid to education, selected salary increases, crime prevention, and prevention of waste

in government appear as both ambiguous and strikingly similar. The Baltimore Sun, apparently recognizing these latter characteristics, stated in an editorial that the Maryland Democrat should beware of "political hot air poisoning."³ The single issue upon which definite stands by the candidates were taken was that of open occupancy. In fact, a statewide League of Women Voters questionnaire, submitted to candidates running for office at every level, indicated that attitudes on integrated housing were more polarized than any other issue. Specifically, it was the candidacy of George Mahoney, millionaire paving contractor, that assisted in making open housing a salient issue.

THE MAHONEY CANDIDACY

The platform George Mahoney adopted in the primary consisted of a single plank, that of an unequivocal opposition to open occupancy. The candidate maintained that, if elected, he would work against open occupancy legislation; if such legislation was passed, he would veto it. In fact, throughout the campaign it became a favorite tactic of Mr. Mahoney to suggest to potential supporters that "if an open housing law passes, federal lawyers will beat on you, you'll be in real bad trouble."⁴ Additionally, the candidate advised Maryland Democrats that the right to sell or rent one's home should not be interfered with by the federal government. This,

claimed Mahoney, was the only issue in the campaign. Probably in response to this latter assertion by Mr. Mahoney, the Baltimore Sun commented in the following manner:

"Mr. Mahoney's case is a special one, not only requiring close consideration but crying for it. The nature of his campaign with its bald appeal to the greatest backward prejudices of voters illustrates...this candidate's utter incapacity for elective office. A principal responsibility of the Democratic party in this primary is to make sure that Mr. Mahoney does not by any chance become Governor of Maryland."⁵

Analysis of the candidate's positions on other issues lends validity to the assertion of ambiguity and ultimate similarity existent in the campaign. Mr. Mahoney stressed the need for increased crime control noting "the new age of savagery." The candidate pointed to the restrictions placed upon state law enforcement agencies by the federal government, the leniency on criminals by the courts, and various organizations such as the Civilian Review Board as a cause for the increased crime rate in the state. Mr. Mahoney appeared to have at least one interpretation for the increased crime rate, but presented no viable solutions to the problem, thus prompting the Sun to again comment that "Mr. Mahoney has failed to discuss the real issues in a specific and forthright manner."⁶ Where the issue of taxes was concerned, the candidate proposed the elimination of duplication, e.g., dispensing with the Baltimore City Departments of Health and Public Works, and placing such services with the responsibility of the state. No reference

was made to the Cooper-Hughes Tax Amendment, a controversial graduated tax proposal which levied from 3 to 6 percent tax on incomes, though the candidate indicated opposition to the present, unpopular property and earnings taxes. Finally, Mr. Mahoney took, what can be labelled as the "expected position" on education (similar to the stance other candidates would take), by stating the necessity for increased state aid to education, and increased salaries for teachers and law enforcement officials. No specific monetary figures were offered.

Clearly, the political strategy of the Mahoney candidacy was based upon his open occupancy position. The Sun had suggested that Mr. Mahoney was counting on the issue of open housing to get elected. Specifically, the strategy of this Democratic hopeful dictated taking the perceived popular stand on a major, single, controversial issue and remain vague on other issues. To other candidates in the primary race, Mr. Mahoney became the "single-issue candidate," whose campaign in the words of rival Clarence Miles, was based upon "racial hatred." However, where significant numbers of Maryland Democrats were concerned, Mr. Mahoney was simply the "anti-open occupancy candidate," whatever its implications. Such a voter perception was the key to the Mahoney success in the primary.

It was aforementioned that the strategy of the Mahoney candidacy was to capitalize on the open occupancy issue. Indeed, open housing was to

become the salient issue in the primary as later analysis indicates. Logically, the platform adopted by a candidate, and his perception of the popular and/or "correct" stand on the key issue(s), can determine electoral victory or defeat. Our point is that Mahoney's victory in the primary is indicative of the candidate's accurate evaluation of the affect of open occupancy as an issue and the correct or popular position maintained. Subsequent analysis of other candidates' strategies will indicate platforms based on considerations other than that of open housing; strategies that proved a failure. In essence, Mahoney diluted the potency of all other issues in the campaign upon which opposition candidates based their strategies.

Electoral analysis appears to support the salient nature of the open occupancy question. Mahoney was to compile 55% of the vote in Southern Maryland, 30% of the vote in Upper Eastern Shore Maryland, and 38% in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area. Previous politico-economic description of these regions suggested a rural, Southern-oriented cultural tradition in these two former areas, and a general ethnic conservatism within the latter region; (see Chapter Two). A quantitative analysis of the primary, conducted by Dr. Robert Leevy of Maryland's Goucher College indicated significant support for Mahoney as a result of the "white backlash." The Political Scientist suggests that Mr. Mahoney won the primary due to the favorable reaction for his candidacy in the white precincts of Baltimore

City and County, where voters had an average of seven to eight years of education and were classified as low to moderate income groups. In addition, given a four candidate race, Mr. Mahoney received an amazing 46% of the white working class vote in Baltimore City and 69% of the Slavic vote.⁷

Our own quantitative analysis, very generally, appears to support the findings of Dr. Leevy. Pearson's Correlation statistical technique indicates that 27% of the variance in Mahoney's vote can be explained by the percent vote for Wallace in a given region. Note: Here we imply a positive association between preference for the segregationist policies of George Wallace in 1964 and attraction for Mahoney's anti-open housing stance. In addition, 15% of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent black in an area (where the greater the black population in a majority white region, the greater the white attraction for George Mahoney); 8% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent urban (where the greater the urban concentration, the less likely the Mahoney vote); this appears likely due to the influence of those areas that voted most heavily for the candidate, i.e., rural Southern Maryland (55%) and rural Upper Eastern Shore Maryland (30%). The Mahoney vote is also characterized by areas of lower foreign stock concentration (which explains 6% of the variance in the candidate's vote, a negative relationship indicating the greater the foreign stock concentration, the less likely a vote for Mahoney); lower

median income (which explains 6% of the variance in the Mahoney vote, a negative relationship indicating the lower the median income the greater the vote for the candidate); percent rural concentration (which explains 6% of the variance in the Mahoney vote, where a positive association is apparent); lower median educational level and lower concentration of white collar occupations (which each explain 4% respectively of the variance in the vote for this candidate). Finally, the percent blue collar concentration in a given area explains 2% of the variance in Mr. Mahoney's vote, a positive relationship indicating a tendency for Mahoney support among blue collar workers.

Multiple Regression analysis allows us to explain 35% of the Mahoney vote.⁸ As noted, 27% of the variance is explained by the percent vote for Wallace in 1964 (a positive association existing between the two variables). Knowledge of percent rural concentration, in addition to the Wallace vote variable allows an increase in explanatory authority to 29% (percent rural concentration is equal to an R Square Change of .01677). The variable, percent black, in addition to knowledge of percent Wallace vote and percent rural concentration, allows an explanatory capacity of 30% (percent black being equal to an R Square Change of .01284). Percent white collar, given knowledge of the aforementioned variables, permits an explanatory capacity of 32% (this latter variable equal to an R Square Change

value of .02451) . Median income level, given the above SES-demographic information, permits an explanatory authority of 34% (the variable, median income, accounting for an R Square Change of .01915) . Other variables with respect to the Mahoney vote, account for less than one percent increase in explanatory capacity although median educational level, representing an R Square Change of .00816, enables us to explain the vote for Mahoney, given other knowledge, by approximately 35%. Given the selected variables of percent vote for Wallace, percent rural concentration, percent black, percent white collar, median income, median educational level, percent foreign stock, percent urban concentration, percent blue collar, the former five variables appear most significant, as judged by R Square Change value, in determining explanatory authority with respect to the Mahoney vote.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Mahoney

- a) high concentration of blacks
- b) lower median income levels
- c) lower median educational level
- d) higher concentration of blue collar occupations
- e) lower concentration of foreign stock
- f) lower urban concentration
- g) high rural concentration
- h) lower concentration of white collar occupations
- i) high percent Wallace vote in the 1964 primary

Note: SES-demographic descriptions are relative to the state mean.

Significant indicators of the Mahoney vote, as judged by R Square Change value are as follows: (in rank order)

- a) percent vote for Wallace
- b) percent rural concentration
- c) percent black population
- d) percent white collar
- e) median income level

In sum, given the first place showing of Mr. Mahoney in Southern, rurally conservative Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland and the traditionally conservative and "white backlash" areas within the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan region, open occupancy as a civil rights question appears to have been the key issue in determining electoral preference. This assertion is supported by both the quantitative study conducted by Dr. Robert Leevy and our own analysis as well. The latter effort indicated the Mahoney vote to be distinguished, in addition to other factors, by areas of high black population concentration (thus, theoretically, permitting open occupancy to appear as a relevant issue to voters), and by areas which demonstrated "significant" support (i.e., greater support than the state mean) for the Wallace candidacy.

The political strategy of George Mahoney, in the primary, appeared successful, though he won with only 33% of the vote. (Indeed the four candidate race probably permitted his victory; this question we will later address). For the present, the candidate was able to take a definite stand on a controversial issue, i.e., open occupancy, choose the perceived popular stand, and win the primary based upon his position on the issue.

Thus one might argue that "political expediency" was a key to the Mahoney success in the primary.

THE SICKLES CANDIDACY

Mahoney's chief opposition in the Democratic primary came from 44 yr. old Congressman-at-Large Carlton Sickles, the only candidate unconditionally supporting open occupancy. It was Sickles whom the Baltimore Sun described as "the darling of the liberals,"⁹ and the Salisbury Times, an Eastern Shore Newspaper, referred to as "the spokesman of labor."¹⁰ The Congressman ran on a platform of "quality government," pointing to the corrupt, inefficient Tawes Administration and the political bossism of Democratic financial contributor George Hocker, a millionaire brewery king. Sickles had frequently stated that the necessity for quality government was the chief issue in the campaign. On other issues, the candidate proposed an end to the unpopular income and earnings tax (as did Mahoney), and an increase in corporate taxes with a simultaneous phasing out of taxes on business personal property. Sickles, in addition, proposed a tax reform plan which he stated would be based upon a revision of the Cooper-Hughes proposal, rejected by the State Legislature in 1965. In retrospect, the tax reform proposals of Mr. Sickles appear somewhat more comprehensive than that of Mr. Mahoney, yet in the final analysis, significant difference is not apparent. Both candidates were opposed to the

unpopular earnings and local income taxes; one candidate favored tax reform based upon a revision of the Cooper-Hughes plan, the other candidate did not address the issue.

Mr. Sickles adopted the expected position on the question of state aid to education and increased salaries for selected occupations. The Congressman proposed additional funds to be provided by the state (as Mahoney had proposed), although Sickles, unlike Mahoney, emphasized the necessity of school construction in Baltimore City in particular. Note that the candidate suggested a \$1500 grant for each child in the public school system, an increase of \$1430 from the present \$70 grant per child by the state! Such a proposal prompted Sickles' opponents, especially Mr. Miles, to label the Congressman as a "candidate in sneakers," i.e., running on a "promise-them-anything" platform.¹¹ In addressing the question of increased salaries for law enforcement officials, Mr. Sickles cited a proposal calling for a minimum of \$5600 to \$6000 for Baltimore City police, a plan somewhat more specific than that suggested by Mr. Mahoney. In sum, however, where issues other than that of open occupancy are concerned, there appears little difference on positions taken by Sickles and Mahoney. If "differences" did exist, voters considered such variances to be minor; alternatively, significant differences may have been perceived on what voters considered minor issues. For example, Congressman Sickles emphasized a particular need

for state aid to education for Baltimore City yet the candidate placed second to Mr. Mahoney who frequently spoke of the incompetencies of city politicians and public officials as a reason for Baltimore's financial problems; Mahoney received 34% of the vote in Baltimore City, Sickles, 32%. In indicating a preference for a tax reform plan, Sickles, as it was noted, suggested a revision of the Cooper-Hughes proposal which in 1965, had been defeated in the State Legislature due to its unpopularity with the wealthier counties (the plan called for a graduated tax system ranging from a 3 to 6 percent levy). Yet the Congressman won the two most rich counties in the state, fared well in a third, but not so in the more marginal areas where such a tax structure might expect to meet with support. Note: In fact, a significant portion of the Cooper-Hughes tax plan was devised by State Senator Harry Hughes from marginal Caroline County.¹²

In low-income Southern Maryland, where unemployment is highest in the state, and housing most inadequate, the Congressman had cited the necessity for increased employment opportunities and additional low cost housing while Mr. Mahoney stressed the issue of integrated housing. Despite this, Mr. Sickles received 13% of the primary vote compared to Mr. Mahoney's 55%.

Given the above examples, we maintain that the issue of open occupancy polarized the Mahoney and Sickles candidacies--no other issue. The

voter acceptance or rejection of the Sickles candidacy was based upon an issue other than that which was the key plank and therefore the major strategy of his campaign. This, it is suggested, lessened the possibilities of the Congressman's potential victory. On the other hand, and to his benefit, the Mahoney candidacy was based upon an acceptance or rejection of his open occupancy stand--an issue and a position which he voluntarily associated himself with. Sickles, possibly to his disadvantage, became labelled as the candidate "unconditionally in favor of open housing," a question he stated was secondary to the necessity of quality government. It is no coincidence that the two candidates most polarized on the issue of open housing placed first and second in a four candidate primary election; (Mahoney with 33% of the vote, Sickles 32%).

We previously referred to Mr. Sickles and his attachment to organized labor. Brief mention of the sources of the candidate's financial support indicate funding from the Citizenship Fund of the United Auto Workers, the Labor Fund-Raising Committee for Carlton Sickles, the Education Fund-Raising of the United Steel Workers, and the Maryland State Committee on Political Education, the political arm of the AFL-CIO. Yet Sickles was to ultimately suffer from his association with organized labor. A Baltimore Sun editorial suggested that Sickles was "too Washington-oriented to have acquired any profound and detailed knowledge of the state and his debt to

labor may be too great at a time when the pressures of labor's demands may well be working against the general interest."¹³ Perhaps such condemnation of the Sickles candidacy due to its ties with labor would have been meaningless if Mr. Sickles had received the support of labor's rank and file. Yet he did not. In fact, the candidate received only 14% of the vote in the white, working class precincts in Baltimore City and County compared to 46% for Mahoney.¹⁴ It was these areas that in a quantitative analysis of the primary, Dr. Robert Leevy classified as regions of "white backlash." It is further suggested, given our own analyses and observations, that Mr. Sickles position on open occupancy cost him the support of the white working class despite the support of organized labor, and as a candidate dependent upon labor for support, such a position cost him the election. Very simply, organized labor could not deliver the vote to the Congressman due to the saliency of the open housing question.

In retrospect, the blueprint of the liberal's campaign strategy was fairly clear. In adopting as the central issue the necessity for quality government and attacking the inefficiency and corruption of the incumbent Tawes Administration, the Congressman considered incumbent Attorney General Thomas Finan as chief Democratic rival, not Mr. Mahoney. Understandably enough, what before the primary campaign had been referred to as the inefficient and corrupt "Tawes-Hecker Regime," by Mr. Sickles,

during the campaign was labelled as the "Tawes-Hocker-Finan Regime."¹⁵ It can be argued that the Congressman's campaign strategy was similar to the "throw the rascals out" platform proved to be successful by Senator Tydings of Maryland. Yet the Sun suggests that the question of open occupancy prevented such a strategy from being a success, given Mr. Sickles position on the subject of integrated housing. In sum, the political strategy of Sickles was both misdirected (in that he dismissed the potential attraction for the Mahoney candidacy given open occupancy), and ineffective (since the candidate was not perceived as a "pro-quality government" advocate, but a candidate in favor of unconditional open housing).

Yet the candidacy of this particular Democratic hopeful failed by only 1%. Quantitative analysis enables an evaluation of support rendered for the candidate. Note that Sickles finished first in only one of seven economic areas within the state, yet he won by a wide margin of 31% in the liberal Washington, D.C. suburban area. The closeness of the election is due to the candidate's strong second place finish in several of the state's more populated areas, i.e., the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area and Maryland Piedmont. A Pearson's Correlation study indicates that 12% of the variance in the Sickles vote is explained by percent black concentration where a "negative r" exists, i.e., the greater the black population in a given area, the less likely a vote for Sickles. Several comments are in order here. We previously stated

that Mr. Mahoney received votes from areas of high black concentration, i.e., where the issue of open occupancy is politically relevant. Given the identical logic, Sickles received votes from, especially, liberal, wealthy Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties, where the population of blacks is minimal. Here, the issue of open housing was not given the same degree of potential conflict, relative to other areas within the state. We emphasize, however, that Mr. Sickles was still identified as the candidate in favor of unconditional open occupancy. Though a negative relationship exists between the variable, percent black, and the Sickles vote, the candidate received 70% of the black vote in regions of 90 to 100 percent black population; however, this figure was substantially lower than that support the Congressman had anticipated. Political observers had concluded before the primary election that the black vote would be split between Sickles and Mr. Finan.

Fifty-seven percent of the variance in the Sickles vote is explained by median income, where a positive association exists, i.e., the greater the median income in a given area, the greater the potential vote for the Congressman; likewise, the less the median income, the less probable support for the candidate. Fifty-one percent of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by median educational level, where a positive

relationship is apparent; 48% of the variance in this particular vote is explained by percent blue collar, where a negative association exists (this appears to reflect Sickles inability to garner the support of labor's rank and file previously noted); 60% of the variance in the Congressman's vote is explained by percent foreign stock, a positive association evident; 49% of the variance is explained by percent urban, a positive association existing between the two variables; 32% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent rural concentration, where a negative relationship is evident; 48% of the variance in the Sickles vote is explained by percent white collar concentration, where a positive association exists; and 32% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by areas having "significantly" (greater than the state mean) voted for the candidacy of George Wallace, where a negative r is apparent.

Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 75% of the Sickles vote. As we noted, 60% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent foreign stock.

A significant foreign stock population, as indicative of support for the Sickles candidacy, reflects the liberal's sole but overwhelming electoral victory in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area. The Candidate compiled 49% of the vote in this region compared to 18% for runner-up Thomas Finan. Foreign stock concentration is the most significant variable

in attempting to explain the Sickles vote (judged by Multiple Regression analysis), in that 17% of the population in the aforementioned economic area is comprised of non-natives; (compared to a state mean of 6%). It is this region that represents the greatest variance in foreign stock population relative to the statewide average, and likewise the most substantial population of this particular group in the state.

Yet a comprehensive evaluation of the Sickles vote must necessarily consider other SES-demographic characteristics, particularly of the Washington Standard Metropolitan region, since the candidate's support originated primarily from that area. Specifically, the little registered support for the 1964 Wallace candidacy (29% compared to 44% for the state average), a high median income level and high urban concentration, all represent significant R Square Change values (and therefore, are important variables in accounting for the Sickles vote). In sum, knowledge of additional variables, even where foreign stock appears as the major explanatory element, assists in evaluating the affect of the latter upon electoral preference. For example; although Multiple Regression analysis indicated that percent foreign stock did not possess a noteworthy R Square Change value (less than 1%) in the determination of the Mahoney vote, the candidate received 69% of Baltimore City's Slavic vote. Further investigation would reveal that a substantial number of the city's foreign stock is classified as

blue collar, lower median income and lower median educational level; these variables typifying support for the Mahoney candidacy. This we compare to the white collar, higher median income and educational level of the Washington region's foreign stock population.

In considering the differentiated electoral choice demonstrated by the Slavic vote in Baltimore City and the foreign stock vote in the Washington area, additional SES variables and the substantial role of the "traditional liberalism" of the latter region, appear to have a primary affect upon influencing candidate selection. NOTE: See the politico-economic discussion of the Washington region's "liberalism" in Chapter Two.

In essence, with respect to the Sickles vote, substantial segments of the foreign stock population, similar to other voters in this economic region won by the Congressman-at-Large, have a liberal political orientation. The foreign stock variable becomes significant in explaining Sickles' support given the group's important numerical presence in this particular area.

Returning to our initial Multiple Regression analysis of the Sickles vote, additional knowledge of a region's vote for Wallace, given percent foreign stock, enables us to explain 72% of the candidate's vote (the Wallace variable accounting for an R Square Change of .11675 or approximately 12%); knowledge of the area's median income level allows us to explain 73% of the candidate's vote, given the above variables (median income level

accounting for an R Square Change of .01590); finally, percent urban concentration, given the aforementioned variables, enables one to explain 74% of the Congressman's vote for governor. The variables percent rural, percent black, and median educational level, together, account for an R Square Change value of approximately 1%.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Sickles

- a) lower concentration of blacks
- b) higher median income level
- c) higher median educational level
- d) lower concentration of blue collar occupations
- e) high concentration of foreign stock
- f) high urban concentration
- g) low rural concentration
- h) high concentration of white collar occupations
- i) low concentration of Wallace support

Significant indicators of the Sickles vote, as judged by the R Square

Change statistic: (in rank order)

- a) percent foreign stock
- b) percent vote for Wallace
- c) median income level
- d) percent urban concentration

In conclusion, the polarized relationship between the Mahoney and Sickles candidacies is emphasized. Quantitative analysis indicates that, without exception, where characteristics indicative of the Mahoney vote exist (e.g., high concentration of blacks, lower median incomes, etc.), the reciprocal is true of areas supportive of the Sickles candidacy. Again, this is the case with all nine of our selected SES-demographic variables.

In no other case, with respect to other candidates, does this reciprocal relationship emerge without exception. Furthermore, we maintain the existence of this association to be a result of each candidate's "extreme" or polarized position on open occupancy.

Finally, the shortcomings of the Sickles campaign strategy is stressed. The candidate was perceived as a candidate in favor of unconditional open occupancy, an issue he claimed was secondary in importance to that of quality government. In essence, Mr. Sickles was judged on an issue strategically evaluated best by Mr. Mahoney. So that forced to take a position on open housing due to the Mahoney candidacy, the liberal, labor candidate's stand cost him substantial electoral support in this four-candidate primary.

THE FINAN CANDIDACY

Incumbent Attorney General Thomas Finan campaigned on a vague platform which cited the past accomplishments of the Tawes Administration, and stated the necessity of tax reform in the state. With regard to the restructuring of the tax system, Mr. Finan proposed a "modified" version of the Cooper-Hughes Tax Amendment; note Sickles desire for a "revision" of the Amendment earlier discussed. In addition, the Attorney General stressed the need for increased state aid to education, an increase of \$240 per pupil.

In an unmistakably ambiguous manner, the candidate proposed increased in the salaries of teachers and law enforcement officials, cited the need for a strengthened conflict of interest law (a key plank of the Miles candidacy), and offered a plan to assault the problem of pollution in the Chesapeake Bay.

Confronted by the candidacy of George Mahoney the candidate was compelled to take a definite position on open occupancy. Mr. Finan, at this time, declared a desire for open occupancy only where commercially owned homes were concerned. "The solution to the problem of housing," he had said, "is adequate housing at low cost with long term federal loans made available to blacks seeking better homes."¹⁶ In general, however, the Attorney General attempted to ignore the issue, at least initially. This, in fact, appeared as the candidate's major campaign strategy; e.g., to take vague positions on non-controversial issues such as state aid to education, proposed conflict of interest laws, increased salaries for teachers and law enforcement officials, and to ignore any controversial issue, i.e., open occupancy. Clearly the Finan candidacy depended upon support from the state Democratic organization which was controlled by the incumbent Tawes Administration. An "extreme" position on a controversial issue was perceived by the Attorney General as potentially damaging to the ability of the party organization to build support for his candidacy in various local areas throughout the state.

Yet it was difficult for Mr. Finan to appear as non-controversial, even given his "moderate" stand on integrated housing. The liberal Americans for Democratic Action criticized the candidate for his position and announced support for Mr. Sickles, while the majority of county Democratic central committees throughout the Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland expressed concern as to what the Attorney General's actions on open occupancy would be, if elected. In one of the candidate's few references to civil rights (and by implication, open housing), Mr. Finan, before the Polish American Club in northeast Baltimore, made clear his support for civil rights but stressed his opposition to civil rights advocates who ignored the law. Later, in the predominately black 4th district of Baltimore City, the Administration's candidate emphasized the civil rights accomplishments under the Tawes-Finan government.¹⁷

Upon initial inspection, the strategy of Mr. Finan appeared to be successful. Indicating the influence and authority of the party organization, the candidate was able to capture 20 to 30 percent of the black vote in areas whose population was 90 to 100 percent black; this despite the wide attraction among blacks for the liberal Sickles. Perhaps the most significant indicator of the authority of the Tawes-Hocker organization was Finan's electoral victory in Lower Eastern Shore Maryland, by all indicators, a Mahoney stronghold. Despite the Southern, rurally conservative nature of

this region (comparable with Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland) , the Attorney General with his position on open occupancy defeated Mr. Mahoney, 39% to 33%. Additional figures indicate, however, that Mr. Mahoney won in Maryland Upper Eastern Shore by compiling 30% of the vote to Finan's second place figure of 27%; in Southern Maryland, Mahoney compiled 55% of the vote compared to 28% for Finan. The Attorney General carried Western Maryland by a landslide with 64% of the vote and was victorious in Maryland Piedmont with 36%.

Unlike the electoral support illustrated for the candidacy of Mr. Mahoney (where support was located primarily in Southern, rurally conservative Upper Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland or the conservative and "white backlash" pockets of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area); and the Sickles candidacy (whose support was centralized in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and among blacks in the Baltimore Metropolitan region) , Mr. Finan's support is not as readily identifiable by economic grouping. That is, the Attorney General's support is not as concentrated relative to the other candidates mentioned. Mr. Finan compiled a majority of votes in Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, but also won the Lower Eastern Shore area. Analysis of economic regions demonstrating support for the candidate indicates a significant diversity in SES-demographic characteristics. We maintain that the support rendered for the Finan

candidacy from these economically differentiated areas was due to the political authority of the Tawes Administration and the state party organization.

Despite this support, however, Mr. Finan was only able to place third in the four candidate primary election, receiving 27% of the vote (compared to 33% for Mahoney and 32% for Sickles). It is hypothesized that the saliency of the open occupancy issue cost the Administration-backed candidate the election, or at least significantly affected his candidacy in an adverse manner. Hypothetically, all factors equal, i.e., open housing as a non-issue, the support of the incumbent Administration, the financial support of the state's major Democratic contributor, and the perceived moderation of the candidate on major issues, logically should have produced electoral victory. A single alternative, again disregarding the question of open occupancy, seems possible. Given the absence of support for the Administration candidate, the "throw the rascals out" campaign of Mr. Sickles would seem to be most attractive to Maryland voters; (given the Tydings victory). This rationale appears logical not given a salient issue in the campaign, specifically open housing. We emphasize once more, however, that the two candidates most polarized on open occupancy received the majority of votes, as opposed to Mr. Finan and his position of moderation. Note: The Attorney General's moderate position on issues did meet with some favor as the Baltimore Sun,

citing the candidate's "good record" in public office, and representation of "the middle road" editorially endorsed Mr. Finan as the best Democratic choice.¹⁸ In the final analysis, however, the moderate position assumed by Mr. Finan on open occupancy, an issue he was compelled to address due to the affect of the Mahoney candidacy, was a successful strategy for an incumbent seeking the political benefits of the state party organization. Given the 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary, however, and the saliency of integrated housing, the support of the state party organization, whatever its influence and authority, was not sufficient to produce electoral victory for the candidate.

Quantitative analysis indicates that 8% of the variance in the Finan vote is explained by percent black population (where a negative association exists between the two variables); 6% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by median income level (where a negative relationship also is apparent); 3% of the variance in the Attorney General's vote is explained by percent blue collar concentration (a positive association is recorded); 10% of the variance in this candidate's support is explained by percent foreign stock concentration (where a negative r is evident); 3% of the variance is explained by percent white collar (a negative relationship exists); and 19% of Mr. Finan's vote is explained by percent vote for Wallace in the 1964 primary (a negative association apparent). Percent urban, percent

rural, and median educational level explain 0% of the variance in the Attorney General's vote.

Multiple Regression analysis demonstrates that 19% of the Finan vote is explained by percent vote for Wallace (Pearson's Correlation also indicated this). Knowledge of an area's foreign stock concentration, given the Wallace variable, enables an explanatory capacity of 41% (the foreign stock variable equal to an R Square Change value of .222542).

We mentioned the affect that the concentration of support in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area had upon the Sickles candidacy (where a substantial foreign stock population was present).

Investigation of Mr. Finan's support indicates a concentration of votes in Western Maryland (foreign stock population only 3%), although the candidate was victorious in the Lower Eastern Shore, non-native population also 3% compared to 6% statewide. The Attorney General compiled 64% of the vote in the former-mentioned region and 39% in the latter. Pearson's Correlation statistic indicates a negative relationship between the foreign stock variable and the vote for Mr. Finan, no doubt reflecting the less than substantial non-native population of Western Maryland in particular (the candidate winning here by an overwhelming margin). Yet it would be difficult to state that Mr. Finan was victorious due to an insignificant foreign stock population (as quantitative analysis of this variable, without further

investigation would indicate). The percent vote for the Wallace candidacy (this variable represents the greatest R Square Change value), rural concentration, and median educational level are essential SES-demographic elements, that in conjunction with percent foreign stock knowledge, permit an accurate evaluation of the candidate's vote. Non-quantitative factors, such as the political abilities of the state political organization and the candidate's "native son" status in Western Maryland also account for some electoral support in this area.

In resuming discussion of Multiple Regression analysis, where the Finan vote is concerned, knowledge of rural concentration, given the percent vote for Wallace and percent foreign stock, permits an explanatory authority of 49% (an increase of 7%); knowledge of median educational level, given the above variables, allows us to explain 53% of the Finan vote (the R Square Change value of the variable, median income, equal to .03974 or approximately 4%). The variables percent black, percent urban, median income, and percent white collar, together, equal less than 1% in R Square Change value. In sum, 53% of the vote for the Attorney General can be explained.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Finan

- a) lower concentration of blacks
- b) lower median income level
- c) no conclusion based upon median educational level
- d) higher concentration of blue collar workers

- e) lower concentration of foreign stock
- f) no conclusion based upon percent urban concentration
- g) no conclusion based upon percent rural concentration
- h) lower white collar concentration
- i) lower concentration of the Wallace vote

Significant indicators of the Finan vote, as judged by the R Square

Change statistic: (in rank order)

- a) percent vote for Wallace
- b) percent foreign stock
- c) percent rural concentration
- d) median educational level

The moderate position on open occupancy espoused by Mr. Finan, possibly could have drawn limited support from those uncomfortable with either of the "extreme" positions of Mr. Sickles or Mr. Mahoney. Yet if the "middle road" position (as the Sun referred to it), was the campaign strategy of the candidate, the plan failed to garner enough electoral support. Mr. Finan, similar to Mr. Sickles, was unable to identify himself with the major plank of his campaign platform. In other words, Mr. Finan was not perceived by voters as the sole candidate that offered tax reform or the lone individual associated with a progressive administration, but as a candidate in favor of open occupancy with limitations. This latter description may have worked to the candidate's disadvantage, as advocates and opponents of open housing became unsure or dissatisfied with respect to

Finan's position; note reaction, aforementioned, by the Americans for Democratic Action and the various county Democratic central committees in the Eastern Shore. Both Sickles and Finan appear to have fallen victim to the Mahoney campaign strategy in which the latter capitalized on a potentially salient issue by compelling others to take a definite position, after he (Mahoney), had taken the perceived popular stand. Such a strategy, in affect, neutralized the significance of the other candidates' platforms.

THE MILES CANDIDACY

The candidacy of lawyer and civic leader Clarence Miles, by all significant description and evaluation, was rather minimal in affect; the candidate receiving eight percent of the vote compared to 33% for Mahoney, 32% for Sickles, and 27% for Finan). Note: Other votes were distributed among four "also-rans" of the eight individuals in the Democratic primary.

The key plank in the Miles platform was the expressed need to streamline government, to end duplication, and thereby save state funds. A chief means to achieve this objective was to consolidate various state agencies. On other issues, the candidate cited the need for conflict of interest laws to be strengthened, an increase in state aid to education, and an increase in salary for law enforcement officials. In sum, the platform of Mr. Miles was closely parallel to that of Attorney General Finan.

Similar to Finan, Mr. Miles was forced into taking a position on open occupancy, despite attempting to avoid the issue. Like the Attorney General, Mr. Miles declared his support for open housing only where commercially owned homes were concerned. Stated Mr. Miles: "Unconditional open occupancy is contrary to every American's right, regardless of race, to occupy and dispose of his home as he sees fit, subject only to zoning and other laws applicable to all property owners."¹⁹ It became essential for Miles to disassociate himself from the similarity with the Finan candidacy. This he attempted to accomplish via a method utilized by Mr. Sickles---by declaring the Attorney General's association with the corrupt and inefficient Tawes-Hocker forces. Note that the Tawes Administration, after considerable outside investigation, had admitted to unethical dealings within the State Roads Commission. Chief administrators were found guilty of selling land to the state at inflated prices, after obtaining advanced knowledge of future valuable properties via state reports.

The Miles campaign strategy was three-fold, dictating the following:

- 1) address, as the major issue in the campaign, the need to streamline government and eliminate duplication of services via consolidation of state agencies (this was also proposed by Mr. Mahoney though, obviously, it was not treated as the most significant issue in the campaign)

2) compelled into an open housing opinion similar to that of Mr. Finan, disassociate himself with similarities of the Finan candidacy by linking the Attorney General to negative aspects of the Tawes Administration; this, however, being a strategy utilized by Mr. Sickles, Mr. Miles attached the Congressman-at-Large on his close association with labor, and his unconditional pro-open occupancy stand.

Note that Mr. Mahoney's candidacy, though causing Miles to address the open housing question, was simply dismissed as that which appealed to "racial hatred."²⁰ Miles was to commit the identical strategic error made by both Sickles and Finan in all but ignoring the Mahoney candidacy relative to the opposition presented by the Attorney General and the Congressman respectively. In support of this evaluation, the Baltimore Sun, via coverage of the candidates and editorial comment, was to suggest that the chief opposition was between Finan and Sickles. Mr. Miles had likewise admitted this.

3) as Mr. Finan attempted to remain non-controversial with regard to the salient open occupancy issue and thus benefit from the political activities of the state party organization, Mr. Miles followed this strategy in hopes of receiving the support of independent Democratic boss Jack Pollack (whose might, traditionally, was wielded in Baltimore City's 4th and 5th districts; note that the term "independent" appears appropriate where Pollack is concerned since the influential Democratic fund-raiser had, in the past,

been known to stray from an incumbent administration's chosen candidate in the party primary

A reason for Mr. Miles' poor fourth place finish in the primary given the similarity with Finan on open occupancy (Miles, 8% of the vote, Finan, 27%), appears able to be explained in a comparison of the political authority of the Tawes-Hocker state party organization and that of a local political boss whose powers, indeed had been disintegrating over the years. As the primary election would indicate (and the subsequent general election), Mr. Pollack's ability to deliver the vote in Baltimore's two aforementioned districts, became dampened as the 4th district became predominately black and the fifth district, Jewish and moderately wealthy. The 4th district, previously dominated by Pollack's Trenton Democratic Club was to be successfully challenged by the black Fourth District Democratic Organization; note that these two organizations would engage in political conflict again in the general election when blacks refused to support Mahoney. In the primary, however, as an indicator of Pollack's crumbling ability to deliver the vote, not a single candidate running for office, opposed by the Fourth District Democratic Organization, was elected in that district, despite sanction by Pollack.

A quantitative analysis of the Miles candidacy must be approached with caution. In six of seven economic areas within the state the candidate placed last (or tied for last), in a four candidate race. He received 1% of the vote

in the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area and Western Maryland respectively, 2% of the vote in Southern Maryland, 9% in Maryland Piedmont, 10% in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, 13% of the vote in the Lower Eastern Shore and 26% in the Upper Eastern Shore where he placed third. Quantitative study of Miles' support reflects his status as "favorite-son" candidate of Queen Anne's County (where he received 56% of the vote). Note that Mr. Miles did not carry, nor did he place second, in any other county within the Upper Eastern Shore (where Queen Anne's County is located).

Given the above reservation, 6% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent black in the area, where a positive association exists (Queen Anne's County is 25% black, greater than the state mean); 3% of the variance in the candidate's vote is explained by percent foreign stock, where a negative relationship is apparent (the county is 5% foreign stock, less than the state mean); 6% of the variance in the Miles vote is explained by median income, a negative relationship evident (this particular area has a median income of \$8200, less than the average for the state); 16% of the variance in Mr. Miles' vote is explained by median educational level, a negative relationship evident (the County's median educational level is 9.5, less than the state average); 12% of the variance is explained by percent blue collar concentration, where a positive association is found (Queen Anne's

County is 65% blue collar, greater than the state average); 10% of the variance in the vote for Miles is explained by percent urban concentration, where a negative relationship is evident (the county is entirely rural); 6% of the variance in this vote is explained by percent rural concentration, a positive r apparent; 12% of the variance is explained by percent white collar occupations, a negative association evident (the county is 35% white collar, below the average for the state); and 18% of the variance in the Miles vote is explained by the percent vote for Wallace, a positive relationship existing (Wallace received 57% of the Queen Anne's vote in the 1964 presidential primary, greater than the state mean) .

Multiple Regression analysis enables us to explain 24% of the Miles vote given knowledge of the percent vote for Wallace and median educational level (the latter variable accounting for an R Square Change value of 7%); knowledge of percent foreign stock, given the aforementioned variables permits explanation of 30% of the candidate's vote (the R Square Change value of the latter variable equal to 6%); percent urban, given other previously mentioned variables enables explanation of 38% of this candidate's vote (R Square Change, in this case, equal to 8%); knowledge of percent blue collar occupations permits us to explain 41% of the Miles vote (R Square Change equal to 3%); finally, percent black, given the aforementioned

information, allows an explanatory capacity of 42% with regard to the candidate's vote (an R Square Change value equal to 1%). In sum, we can explain 42% of Mr. Miles' vote.

Characteristics Indicative of Support for Miles

- a) high concentration of black population
- b) lower median income
- c) lower median educational level
- d) high blue collar concentration
- e) lower concentration of foreign stock
- f) lower percent urban
- g) higher percent rural
- h) lower percent white collar occupations
- i) high percentage of Wallace votes

Significant indicators of the Miles vote, as judged by the R Square

Change statistic: (in rank order)

- a) percent vote for Wallace
- b) median educational level
- c) percent foreign stock
- d) percent urban
- e) percent blue collar
- f) percent black

In final analysis of the Miles candidacy, the lawyer and civic leader appears to have suffered from his moderate position on the important open housing question, as did Mr. Finan. Yet the former candidate could not compile the amount of support garnered for the Attorney General. This, we maintain, was the result of local political boss, Jack Pollack's inability to

organize support for Miles as the Tawes Administration's state political organization was to assist Mr. Finan.

Again, in the Miles case this time, Mr. Mahoney strategically compelled a candidate to assume a position on an issue not considered to be key in the campaign by the former Democrat; this, we judge simply by Mr. Miles campaign platform. Mr. Miles was not identified as the proponent of government thrift, but was associated with a moderate open housing stand; thus having the identical adverse affects upon both proponents and opponents of open occupancy earlier discussed with respect to the Finan candidacy.

In conclusion to the discussion of the 1966 Maryland Democratic Primary, it is maintained that electoral preference was based upon the salient issue of open housing--an issue strategically approached by Mr. Mahoney, and a strategy we can best describe as politically expedient (a year earlier, in 1965, Mr. Mahoney had publicly expressed his support for open occupancy) Three major factors indicate the role played by this issue in determining candidate selection: (1) the two candidates most polarized on integrated housing received the majority of votes (2) on other issues cited within our discussion, close similarity exists among the positions taken by the candidates (3) the victory of the single-issue oriented (anti-open occupancy) candidate, George Mahoney, illustrates the important nature of the issue in determining electoral preference.

Additionally, it seems as though the candidacy of Mr. Finan substantially lessened the chances of Mr. Sickles. Consideration of two key characteristics of each candidate's support indicate popularity from areas distinguished by a lower concentration of blacks and regions that demonstrated a lower percentage vote for Wallace. Thus the candidates split the vote among such areas. This appears to have been the case in Maryland Piedmont where Sickles compiled 25% of the vote compared to 36% for Finan and 25% for Mahoney; and in the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area where Sickles received 23% of the vote, compared to 23% for Finan and 38% for Mahoney. We have previously indicated that Finan compiled 20 to 30 percent of the black vote in areas of 90 to 100 percent black population, this to the disadvantage of Sickles who compiled approximately 70% of such vote.

It is possible, however, that the candidacy of Mr. Sickles lessened the chances of Mr. Finan being elected. Given the absence of the Sickles candidacy, and the alternatives of Mahoney, Finan, and Miles, the electorally significant, liberal Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, a significant portion of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area, organized labor, the entire black vote, and the support garnered by the state party organization, would have seemingly resulted in a victory for the Attorney General.

The candidacy of Mr. Miles had two possible affects. Given a similarity with Mr. Finan where position on the issue of open occupancy was concerned, the former candidate may have taken potential votes from the Attorney General among those who favored a moderate stand on this question; both Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox indicate this in Maryland: A History, 1632-1974.²¹ Yet given the marginal support rendered for the Miles candidacy, it would have been essential for Mr. Finan to have received almost all of the votes Mr. Miles received to have won the primary. A second possible affect of the Miles candidacy, judged by our quantitative analysis, is that the candidate simply prevented Mr. Mahoney from receiving greater support in the primary due to the former candidate's vote in Queen Anne's County; however, Mahoney still won the Upper Eastern Shore area by 3% over Mr. Finan. Note that the characteristics indicative of support for the Mahoney and Miles candidacies are identical with respect to all SES-demographic variables, yet the implications of Miles taking votes from Mahoney are minimal, again given the former candidate's poor showing electorally.

Whether the Mahoney strategy would have been successful in a two candidate race appears doubtful, given the support registered for candidates with views on open occupancy different than that of this Democrat. Yet this is merely speculation and furthermore, is not the topic of our discussion here. In fact, given a multi-candidate primary, and a potentially salient

issue, Mr. Mahoney's strategy of capitalizing on these circumstances enabled him to win the primary with 33% of the vote. However, doubt as to the possible success of an individual in a two candidate race whose political fortunes are based entirely on an anti-open occupancy stand, is a relevant concern with respect to the general election.

Discussion of the Maryland Republican Primary can be quickly dismissed. Baltimore County Executive, Spiro Agnew, holding the most important administrative office of all Republicans in the state, easily received his party's nomination with 84% of the vote in a five candidate race.²² Running on a platform of tax reform, the candidate's closest rival compiled 8% of the vote.

Primary Election Results

WESTERN MARYLAND	Mahoney 18%	Sickles 17%	Finan 64%	Miles 1%	Others 0%
MARYLAND PIEDMONT	Mahoney 25%	Sickles 25%	Finan 36%	Miles 9%	Others 5%
SOUTHERN MARYLAND	Mahoney 55%	Sickles 13%	Finan 28%	Miles 2%	Others 2%
UPPER EASTERN SHORE	Mahoney 30%	Sickles 13%	Finan 27%	Miles 26%	Others 4%
LOWER EASTERN SHORE	Mahoney 33%	Sickles 12%	Finan 39%	Miles 13%	Others 3%
BALTIMORE STANDARD METRO. AREA	Mahoney 38%	Sickles 23%	Finan 23%	Miles 10%	Others 6%
WASHINGTON STANDARD METRO. AREA	Mahoney 13%	Sickles 49%	Finan 18%	Miles 1%	Others 19%

Economic Areas by County

WESTERN MARYLAND	MARYLAND PIEDMONT	SOUTHERN MARYLAND
Allegany County	Carroll County	Calvert County
Garrett	Frederick	Charles
	Harford	St. Mary's
	Howard	
	Washington	
EASTERN SHORE UPP.	BALTIMORE STANDARD	WASHINGTON STANDARD
Cecil County	METROPOLITAN AREA	METROPOLITAN AREA
Caroline	Baltimore County	Prince Georges County
Kent	Anne Arundel	Montgomery
Queen Anne's	Baltimore City	
Talbot		

CHAPTER IV

THE GENERAL ELECTION

Initial analysis of the general election indicates that Republican Spiro Agnew's victory pivoted upon substantial leads in Montgomery County (37,000) , Baltimore City (24,000) , and Prince Georges County (14,000) . He carried all of Western Maryland and Maryland Piedmont (traditional Republican areas) , the Eastern Shore counties of Talbot and Wicomico, and Harford County, northeast of Baltimore City. The former County Executive received 455,318 votes compared to 373,543 for the Democrat, Mahoney; (Agnew compiled 50% of the vote compared to 40% for Mahoney) . The anti-open housing candidate won eleven counties situated in Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland, and Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, politico-economic units of the Baltimore Standard Metropolitan Area. Estimates of ethnic support gave Agnew over 80% of the black vote, approximately 75% of the Jewish vote and Mahoney heavy majorities among Italians and Slavs. Additional study of the Democrat's support reveals that of the sixteen counties that voted for George Wallace in the 1964 Presidential Primary, Mr. Mahoney received majorities in twelve (primarily Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland

counties). The Alabama Governor received 57% support from the aforementioned cluster of counties compared to 53% for Mahoney two years later. State-wide, Wallace received 44% of the vote contrasted with 40% for the Maryland Democratic gubernatorial candidate. So that with minimal exception, those counties attracted to the Wallace candidacy in 1964, cast support for Mahoney in 1966 with similar fervor. (Jim Lucas, in Agnew: Profile in Conflict, reports that the Mahoney candidacy may have suffered to some extent, in Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland, due to traditional anti-Catholic feeling in those areas.)¹

Basically, Mr. Agnew was able to win the election due to previously mentioned majorities in populous Baltimore City (which contains 52% of the state's voters) and the traditionally liberal Washington suburbs (Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties), where 24% of Maryland's registered voters reside. Mahoney was victorious in thirteen of the state's twenty-three counties, most of them less populated rural areas with the exception of Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties. Eastern Shore and Southern Maryland, casting majority support for the Democrat, represent only 11% and 2% of the state's voting population respectively. Lastly, even though Mahoney was victorious in populous Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties, the candidate's margin of victory in these areas, (6,000 and 13,000 respectively),

was not sufficient to offset Agnew's support in the above-mentioned regions.

Further description of the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election requires (1) a consideration of the "politics" of the campaign (2) a treatment of county candidate preference patterns. It is suggested that the governor's race was single issue oriented and that an investigation of electoral behavior must depend upon a study of candidate policy orientation toward open housing. Treatment of secondary issues in the campaign is significant in illustrating the relative similarity between candidates on policy stance and therefore the increased role assigned to the open occupancy issue as a determinant of electoral preference.

It can be hypothesized that the political strategy of the Democrat, George Mahoney, was based upon the popularity of the George Wallace candidacy in the 1964 Maryland Democratic Presidential Primary where the Alabama Governor received 44% of the vote. Implied, here, is a positive association between the appeal for the segregationist policy orientations of Wallace and the anti-open occupancy position of Mahoney. In fact, major criticism of the Mahoney candidacy, by the Baltimore City press and opposition candidate Agnew, centered upon the Democrat's failure to concern himself with issues other than open occupancy. The Mahoney strategy, then, involved campaigning on a single issue. The Democrat adopted a position on

this issue that he perceived capable of attracting votes, based upon the success of the Wallace candidacy two years earlier.

Specifically, the sentiment expressed by the candidate vis-a-vis open housing, was that such a policy infringed upon the freedom of the home owner to sell or rent his property to whomever he wanted. Said Mahoney in a political advertisement that appeared in the Baltimore Sun newspaper: "If an open housing bill is passed, you can be fined and sent to jail if you violate the law. I am in opposition to any law which takes away the home owner's right to sell or rent the home in which he lives in any way he chooses."² Earlier, Mahoney had assured potential supporters by declaring that should he be elected, there would never be open occupancy in Maryland for he would veto such a measure. Throughout the campaign, Republican candidate Agnew and a lesser Independent hopeful had seized an opportunity to attack the Democrat's open housing stand by declaring that the issue was a federal matter as opposed to a state concern. The rationale here, was that since possible open occupancy legislation would originate from the national congress, if at all, talk of the governor's veto power was irrelevant. One week prior to election day, when confronted with the fact that open occupancy legislation was a federal concern, on "Eyewitness Newsmakers" (a local television program), the candidate confessed that he would submit to national legislation on integrated housing.³ Most significant is the realization of the

candidate's awareness of the status of the issue throughout the campaign, yet his continued pledge to veto such legislation as governor.

The campaign for the candidacy of Republican Spiro Agnew, Baltimore County Executive, stalled during the initial stages due to the candidate's inability to focus attention away from the issue of open housing. Agnew's self-perceived political attraction rested with his ability to draw attention to his proposed tax reform measures for the state. The Republican's predicament became apparent when he found it seemingly essential to narrow the disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy question. The County Executive likewise claimed that he would veto any housing legislation affecting the right of the individual home owner to sell his property to whomever he wished. (A month later Agnew would claim that open occupancy was a federal issue).

So that Agnew's strategy was to narrow differences between himself and Mahoney vis-a-vis the position on housing (thus attracting attention to other issues, particularly tax reform). However, the pursuit of this strategy "backfired" on the Republican. By addressing the open housing issue and attempting to create a similarity between himself and the Democrat, the issue commanded greater attention and a greater potential vote for Mahoney due to his position on integrated housing dating back to the primary (Agnew had not mentioned the question of open occupancy in the Republican primary).

Very simply analyzed, in a state that is heavily Democratic, such as Maryland (Democrats outnumber Republicans 3 to 1), where the two major candidates are perceived as taking the identical stand, the advantage rests with the Democrat. Later realizing this, Agnew was to revise his open occupancy stand declaring in late October that should such a bill receive support "by a majority sentiment" and pass in the State Legislature, he would not veto it.⁴

The last stage of Agnew's policy change toward integrated housing was a declaration that the issue was a concern to be debated in the national congress and therefore not a relevant gubernatorial campaign matter. A key strategy at this point was the initiation of personal attacks upon Mahoney, questioning the Democrat's competence and knowledge of the state's socio-economic problems.

During the initial stages of the gubernatorial campaign, the offensive was initiated by Mahoney's position on a single issue, the candidate's self-perceived strength. The Republican, Agnew, was compelled to revise his strategy several times as a response to the Mahoney initiative. By attempting to narrow the disparity between himself and the Democrat on the open housing question, in essence, the County Executive placed himself on the defensive. Only upon adopting the last of three strategies, i.e., declaring the issue a federal matter and therefore not a concern for a gubernatorial race, did the candidate assume a more offensive plan. The significance

of this offensive-defensive dichotomy has particular implications for the Agnew candidacy. Key Republican strategists had commented, that because of the state's Democratic majority, it was essential that Agnew take the initiative. The Republican's last of three campaign strategies appeared to reflect the accuracy of this evaluation. Key phrases that appeared in all of the Republican's speeches throughout the campaign reflect this. Reminding the electorate of the Democrat's stand on open housing, Agnew referred to Maryland as a "potential Maddoxville"⁵ (in reference to Segregationist Lester Maddox, Governor of Georgia), should Mahoney be elected. Another familiar phrase of the Republican, signaling his realization of the significance of Maryland's 3 to 1 Democratic ratio, was that given the Democrat's position on open occupancy, "this time party loyalty demands too much."⁶

So that, in summary, Agnew's campaign strategy reflected three, basic stages.

- 1) the first stage where Agnew attempted to narrow policy differences between himself and the Democrat on the open occupancy issue thus hoping to create greater public attention upon other issues
- 2) the second stage where Agnew attempted to present himself as a moderate on open occupancy, creating a degree of disparity between himself and Mahoney; the affect of this strategy was to admit the relevancy of the issue, thus attracting greater attention, still, to the Mahoney candidacy

3) the third stage where the Republican attempted to place Mahoney on the defensive (or place himself on the offensive) , thereby creating greater public concern for other issues , in declaring open occupancy a federal question and not a concern of state politics

Further investigation of the 1966 governor's race indicates that the Republican's third stage strategy was met with only limited success, i.e., electoral preference ultimately was decided based upon a positive or negative response to Mahoney's open housing position rather than reaction to the tax reform proposals , or stands taken on other secondary issues by the Republican. Of key significance vis-a-vis the position taken by Agnew on open housing during the third stage of his strategy , was the perception among the electorate of a policy alternative relative to Mahoney. So that a negative reaction to the Democrat's stand on the open occupancy issue is equated with a positive response to the Agnew candidacy. Noteworthy, is the suggestion that since an attraction for Agnew may have been dependent upon a negative response to Mahoney's open housing stand (given the Democratic majority in the state) at no time did the Republican actually command the initiative or take the offensive in the campaign.

According to Agnew, the major concern for the State in 1966 (and therefore the key issue in the election) was the inadequacy of the present tax structure. Such an evaluation of Maryland's socio-economic status, in

this regard, was shared by the locally influential Baltimore Sun and Salisbury Daily Times newspapers. The sentiment expressed by the latter publication, i.e., the major significance of the tax reform issue as opposed to open housing, is noteworthy in that the Times originates from the rurally conservative, Southern oriented, Lower Eastern Shore where prime concern in this election might expect to be over the issue of open occupancy. The problem in the Maryland tax structure reflected a continuous conflict and competition between the state and its various local subdivisions vis-a-vis the ability to collect and distribute such revenues. As of 1966, the local government's ability to collect taxes was limited to an unpopular property and earnings tax since the collection of sales and income taxes was pre-empted by the state. On the average, only one dollar of every four dollars and fifty cents collected by the state was redistributed to the local sub-division.⁷ The problem of such a tax structure is realized in that local areas were chiefly responsible for maintaining a certain quality and quantity of public services. Those sectors most frequently mentioned as suffering from the inadequacy of revenue were public education and safety.

Both candidates agreed that the tax structure needed revamping, yet the Democrat, Mahoney, in focusing his campaign totally upon an anti-open housing stand, did not address the former issue in much detail. The revision in the tax system, advocated by Agnew, entailed an abolishment of the

unpopular property and earnings tax. In addition, the Republican called for a more centralized tax system, i.e., the state should assume partial financial responsibility in maintaining particular local public services, e.g., the Baltimore City Police Department and the construction of public school facilities, particularly in the City. Simultaneously, Agnew proposed that the state redistribute one of every three dollars collected, back to the local subdivision. Given the need for additional monies for the upkeep and maintenance of the police department in local areas (especially Baltimore City), the City public school system, and an increase in wages for teachers, police, and state civil servants, the County Executive expressed the belief that state taxes would necessarily increase by 1968.

The tax revision proposal, in many respects similar to the 1965 Cooper-Hughes Amendment, met with limited opposition in the wealthier counties due to a feeling that such counties were "footing the bill" for public services in Baltimore City. This had also been the concern of the wealthy counties in 1965 when the aforementioned amendment was defeated. The Amendment, in effect, called for a graduated tax structure. (Our previous assertion that open occupancy was the key, salient issue in determining candidate preference appears additionally valid here given the electoral support for the Agnew candidacy among the wealthier counties, despite opposition to an aspect of his tax reform proposal.) Very simply, reaction to Agnew's tax

reform proposals was not a major criteria for electoral preference. Again, candidate preference appears, more than not, to have been a function of a rejection or acceptance of Mahoney's stand on open occupancy.

The Democratic candidate had likewise expressed a desire to abolish the unpopular property and earnings taxes while simultaneously citing the need for increases in public services, i.e., improvements in the police department, increased school construction, increased wages for teachers, policemen and civil servants, etc. Yet unlike Agnew, Mahoney proposed a TAX CUT on both the state and local level (this, while services were to be increased and wages raised). "Business-like efficiency" would enable an increase in services while allowing taxes to be cut, stated Mahoney.⁸ The Baltimore Sun, in response, referred to the Democrat as a "flim-flam artist" in attempting to present such a policy as a legitimate possibility.⁹

In answer to a position questionnaire submitted to Mahoney by the League of Women Voters, the candidate suggested public ownership of metropolitan area transit companies, the development of a rapid transit system, better equipped police, a police morale program (which included an increase in wages and a get tough policy with criminals--"to hit first and fire first" as it was termed)¹⁰ an increase in teachers' pay, teachers' colleges and vocational schools, and an assault upon water pollution. These programs again, were to be initiated despite an across-the-board tax cut on both the state and

local level. (The Democrat adhered to an official policy throughout the campaign, of non-debate with the other candidates (Agnew and a lesser Independent)). In effect, at no time was Mahoney required to publicly defend the rationality or feasibility of his programs and policies. The candidate accepted invitations from selected civic organizations where there was a guarantee that opposition candidates would not appear or were not invited. In most cases, such civic organizations sought reassurance by the Democrat, of his pledge against open housing. Often, other issues, such as tax reform were not discussed. The Democrat's reasoning in not addressing or debating with the other candidates was that he was not running against any single individual but "the state of things as they are."¹¹ The Salisbury Times had attacked such reasoning by claiming Mahoney's association with the present Democratic Administration in Annapolis, i.e., he had received the incumbent governor's endorsement and had benefitted from the Administration's traditional financial backers (this referred primarily to brewery millionaire, George Hocker). The same newspaper had referred to Mahoney's policy of non-debate as "insulting to the voters of Maryland"¹² while the Baltimore Sun had referred to such behavior as an "indication of the Democrat's ignorance of the issues and his general incompetence."¹³ In fact, Mahoney's only comment on a possible program to facilitate tax reform in Maryland was that, if elected, he would appoint a blue-ribbon panel to study waste and inefficiency in government.

In answer to a position questionnaire submitted to Agnew by the League of Women Voters, the candidate suggested a more equitable distribution of the tax burden among all citizens and an assault, particularly, upon the fiscal crisis in urban subdivisions, co-ordinated planning in transportation, an assault upon water pollution, increases in wages (law enforcement officials, teachers, and civil servants), and improvement in the public school system, especially school building construction.

Noteworthy is the Republican candidate's emphasis on policies beneficial to urban areas and programs generally perceived as "liberal," e.g., a more equitable distribution of the tax burden, a more centralized tax structure (more state responsibility for local services--especially in Baltimore City). In seeking the urban, liberal vote, the Republican appeared to have realized his slim chances for gathering massive rural conservative support (save traditionally Republican Western Maryland), in great part due to the stand on open occupancy. (We refer here, specifically, to the rural conservative vote in Southern, Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Maryland respectively.) The Baltimore Sun had reported Agnew as publicly admitting he would lose the entire conservative vote and a significant number of the rural vote (later quantitative analysis confirms this), but had hoped to compensate for this by capturing the liberal and urban vote within the Democratic party.¹⁴ (In essence, the Republican hoped to gain the support

garnered by the two major Democratic candidates who lost to Mahoney in the primary (Carlton Sickles and Thomas Finan)). Both of these candidates had received overwhelming liberal, urban and black support. Sickles and Finan together accounted for 59% of the Democratic vote.

In evaluating the two candidates' positions on open housing and on "secondary issues" (issues other than integrated housing), particularly tax reform, we suggest that electoral behavior most likely was based upon an acceptance or rejection of the Democrat's anti-open housing stand. Given the Republican's third stage strategy, a policy alternative on this issue was perceived. Where the issue of tax reform was concerned, there appeared less of a policy alternative, i.e., both candidates proposed to abolish the unpopular earnings and property taxes. Indeed, the chief concern over the issue of tax reform, vis-a-vis voter response, appeared to be a question of the Democrat's credibility in proposing a tax reduction while simultaneously citing goals for programs which obviously would demand increased funding. (We previously cited the Salisbury Times where key consideration was given to Mahoney's failure to debate with other candidates (especially on the issue of tax reform), and the Baltimore Sun which referred to the Democrat's questionable credibility vis-a-vis the feasibility of his tax proposals.) This appears to indicate a basis for candidate preference on grounds other than open occupancy. However, as later quantitative analysis will indicate,

Mahoney was victorious in these areas in which the aforementioned publications are located.

Additional similarity among each candidate on secondary issues is apparent in evaluating their positions as cited via the previously mentioned League of Women Voters questionnaire.

Given an introduction as to the policy orientations of the two candidates on open occupancy and other secondary issues, we now want to approach a discussion of "the Mahoney vote" and "the Agnew vote." This effort requires a two-step procedure: (1) a discussion of each candidate's organized, political support (2) a quantitative analysis of county candidate preference. Our specific purpose is to study the relationship between such preferences and selected socio-economic variables in order to determine characteristics of counties common to support for Agnew and the same with respect to Mahoney. Selected variables include: percent black, percent foreign stock, percent urban, percent rural, median income and education, percent blue collar and white collar, and percent vote for Wallace in the 1964 Democratic Presidential Primary in Maryland. In order to facilitate such a study, the state has been geographically sub-grouped into economic regions as suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States.¹⁵

A discussion of candidate organizational support must be approached with a major limitation in mind. Knowledge of such support does not

necessarily indicate a pattern of county political preference or behavior to be suspected. In other words, to state that the Baltimore Sun supported the Agnew candidacy does not indicate, necessarily, that Baltimore City or the Baltimore Metropolitan Area supported the Republican. Note that, in fact, the Baltimore Metropolitan Area voted for Mahoney. An analysis of socio-economic characteristics, by county or economic region, appears more dependable in citing suspected candidate preference.

However, while a discussion of candidate organizational support at best represents an unreliable indication of ultimate electoral preference, such an undertaking satisfactorily serves as an introduction to possible political orientations and electoral patterns prior to SES analysis (our opening remarks on candidate campaign strategies and issues served this same purpose).

If, as we already stated, the Agnew campaign strategy was to seek the favor of Democratic liberals, judging by the candidate's organizational support, such a strategy appeared successful. Both the Baltimore City branch of the Committee on Political Education (the political arm of the AFL-CIO), and the urban based Americans for Democratic Action (who supported 85% of the state's Democratic candidates in 1966), indicated official support for the Republican.¹⁶ In fact, the ADA had adopted a "get tough" policy with those many local, Democratic candidates it was supporting (some

receiving financial assistance), claiming an immediate denunciation by the organization, of any candidate that sanctioned or demonstrated support for the Mahoney candidacy. Dominic Fornano, head of the local branch of the AFL-CIO, in addressing union members at a "Citizens for Agnew" rally, had lauded the pro-labor record of the Republican as Baltimore County Executive.¹⁷ (The organizational support of the AFL-CIO and COPE in particular had limited affect upon the electoral behavior of labor.) That labor voted overwhelmingly for Mahoney is illustrated in our quantitative analysis. This supports our assertion that organizational support does not necessarily indicate a pattern of county or area candidate preference.

Other support for the Agnew candidacy originated from the Baltimore Sun, citing the Republican's "proven administrative ability" and "knowledge of the state's social and economic problems," while denouncing the Mahoney candidacy as a "racist campaign" and an "appeal to prejudice and bigotry."¹⁸ In addition, the Baltimore County Executive had compiled unified support from the City's black population, where this group accounted for 35% of the registered vote. Agnew was to receive an incredible 90% of the black vote in Baltimore City compared to 40% for the Republican gubernatorial candidate in 1962; a majority of this vote originating from the predominately black 4th District.¹⁹ Throughout the campaign, Agnew had openly received the support

of Baltimore's two most influential black politicians, State Senators Clarence Mitchell and Verda Welcome.²⁰

In addition to the support generated in the City's predominately black 4th District, Agnew gathered further votes in the "silk stocking," liberal 5th District. Republican support in these two districts is especially significant given the traditional stronghold in these areas by Democratic political boss Jack Pollack. Of interest in the 1966 election is the political conflict between Pollack's established Trenton Democratic Club, comprised of "old guard" party workers dating back to immediate post World War II, and the newly formed, predominately black Fourth District Democratic Organization. The ability of the Republican to garner support from the Fourth and Fifth Districts, then, seemed to indicate the beginning of the end of the Pollack organization's control over the area. (As a sidenote, perhaps further indicating the breakdown of the Pollack machine, State Senator Clarence Mitchell (backed by the Fourth District Democratic Organization) easily defeated his Pollack supported opponent.

In addition to seeking the traditional liberal Democratic and black votes, Agnew attempted to remain in favor with Maryland's only two Republican counties (Allegany and Garrett Counties). Open occupancy appears not to have been as salient of an issue here, relative to other areas in the state (later quantitative analysis seems to imply this). Surprisingly enough, the

Cumberland Morning News, in stating that both candidates advocated the identical open housing stand, cited the Democrat Mahoney as the preferred choice due to his "proven business expertise" (Mahoney's construction business enabled him to become a millionaire).²¹ It was thought that the Democrat's abilities would best assure a positive business climate as opposed to the administrative expertise of Agnew. Noteworthy is the Beale and Bogue description of Allegany and Garrett Counties where economic recessions in the state are first to affect this area. (Again, however, candidate preference in this Western Maryland area appears not to have been a function of a choice based upon secondary issues (in this case, "business expertise" versus "administrative expertise"), as judged by the ultimate electoral support for Agnew.) We suggest that such support was based upon a negative response to the Mahoney candidacy (in an area where open occupancy was not a relevant issue due, in part, to an insignificant number of blacks), and the Democrat's failure to address other issues in depth relative to the Republican.

Definitely surprising was the support rendered to the Agnew candidacy by the Salisbury Daily Times, which we mentioned originates from the rurally conservative lower Eastern Shore portion of Maryland. Note that George Wallace received approximately 68% of the vote in 1964 in this area. The newspaper cited, in a "Voter's Right to Know" editorial, "the Democrat's

insulting behavior in refusing to debate the issues with the other candidates and his failure to accept numerous invitations by civic groups to discuss issues." In addition, the publication attacked Mahoney's association with the "Tawes-Hocker Regime" (as previously stated, the Democrat rationalized his policy of non-debate with other candidates in that he was "running against the state of things as they are").²² Ironically, Mahoney had attacked opposition candidate Thomas Finan in the Democratic primary as being delinquent in his duties and associated with a corrupt government (Finan was the Attorney General under the Tawes Administration). Now that the campaigning for the general election had begun, Mahoney had graciously accepted the support of the Tawes regime. So that in retrospect, the Salisbury newspaper's support for Agnew appeared as a function of dissatisfaction with the Mahoney candidacy as opposed to satisfaction with the Republican's open housing stand. However, it is again important to realize that organizational support (in this case support from the press), does not especially indicate a pattern of county electoral behavior. Note that quantitative analysis and voter election returns demonstrate overwhelming support for Mahoney in this Eastern Shore region.

In analyzing the support behind the Mahoney candidacy, it is essential to briefly discuss the proceedings of the State Democratic Convention in 1966. It is accurate to state that the Democratic candidate represented a

divided party (he received 33% of the vote in the primary) , due mostly to conflicts among party members as to what official position Democrats should adopt on the open occupancy issue . In fact, the above prospect had been the concern of many Democrats during the primary, given the significant negative response to Mahoney's "Your Home is Your Castle--Protect It" theme indicative of his anti-open housing stand . Both of Maryland's Democratic U.S. Senators , Joseph Tydings and Daniel Brewster , refused to publicly endorse Mahoney at any time . In addition, chief Democratic rival in the past primary , Carlton Sickles , publicly denounced the Mahoney candidacy as "racist" just prior to the Convention , as did lesser Democratic rival Clarence Miles.²³ The other major opposition to Mahoney in the Democratic Primary , Attorney General Thomas Finan , ultimately supported the Democratic representative after he succumbed to the pressure of Governor Tawes' "party loyalty politics ." (Curiously enough , the former Attorney General later received a state judgeship--weeks prior to the general election) . Significant , however , is the lack of support apparent within the Maryland Democratic Party for the Mahoney candidacy .

Mahoney's response in attempting to confront this problem of disunity was to "pack" key Convention committees , the platform committee in particular , with advocates of his anti-open occupancy stand . Realizing the pursuit of such a strategy in advance , the response of the out-numbered , liberal

element (out-numbered vis-a-vis positions held in key committees) , was to boycott the Convention. Nevertheless, a "rubber stamp" vote was taken at the Convention on whether to officially adopt the slogan "Your Home is Your Castle-Protect It" (along with the implications of the slogan) . By a 138-45 margin, the slogan was adopted as the official policy on open occupancy in Maryland by the State Democratic Party. Chief dissent, among those who were present at the gathering, originated from Baltimore City's 4th and 5th Districts and the wealthy, liberal, Washington D.C. suburban counties of the state.

The overall affect of these events at the Convention was Mahoney's reliance upon "old guard" Democrats to build a coalition of popular and organizational support. Such Democrats included the aforementioned Jack Pollack, political boss in Baltimore City, Emerson Harrington Jr., aged 72, an unofficial Democratic organizer in Eastern Shore Dorchester County (whose father, in the typical Eastern Shore Maryland aristocratic style, was once governor of the state); Wilbur Dulin, former state senator from the Baltimore Matropolitan Area's Anne Arundel County, who had been politically inactive since 1956; Philip Dorsey, Jr., who was presently a circuit judge in Southern Maryland and whose son was running for state senator, and George Hocker, brewery monopolist and perennial Democratic fund raiser.²⁴ It was most likely the activities of these individuals that assisted in the

creation of a favorable image of the Mahoney candidacy as expressed by the Annapolis Evening Capital newspaper. The publication, originating from Anne Arundel County, described the Democrat as "a protector of the little man against growing federal intervention in states' and individual rights."²⁵ (Interestingly enough, the George Wallace candidacy in 1964 had been described in a like manner.) The Capital, in declaring its support for the Democrat, stated that while Agnew's administrative experience made him a more acceptable candidate to the entire state, the Mahoney position on open occupancy was more acceptable to Anne Arundel County voters. Note the emphasis attributed to the issue of open occupancy (later electoral analysis indicates that Anne Arundel County indeed voted for Mahoney).

It seems apparent, in discussing the Mahoney candidacy, originating with the conflict in the Convention and given the comments of the Evening Capital, that open housing was possibly the single most salient issue in the 1966 gubernatorial election. Typically enough, the Democrat received the unsolicited yet accepted support of the Maryland branch of the National States' Rights Party and the Interstate Ku Klux Klan.²⁶

In consideration of the Mahoney candidacy as single issue oriented toward open housing, the Baltimore Sun predicted widespread appeal for the Democrat in the rural, conservative areas of Southern and Eastern Shore Maryland, with the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered a "toss up."²⁷

The Republican, Agnew, was predicted support in traditionally Republican Western Maryland, Piedmont Maryland, where open occupancy was not seen as a major issue relative to other regions in the state, the Washington D.C. suburban counties, the "heart" of Maryland liberalism, with the Baltimore Metropolitan Area considered as a struggle.²⁸

Predicted Areas of Support for Agnew²⁹

- a) Western Maryland
- b) Washington D.C. suburban area
- c) Piedmont Maryland
- d) possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area

ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION 90%

EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 38%

Predicted Areas of Support for Mahoney³⁰

- a) Lower Eastern Shore Maryland
- b) Upper Eastern Shore Maryland
- c) Southern Maryland
- d) possibility of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area

ABOVE REGIONS' PERCENT OF STATE'S VOTING POPULATION 63%

EXCLUSIVE OF BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA 11%

A quantitative analysis of selected demographic and socio-economic variables will allow an accurate definition of the composition of "the Mahoney vote" and "the Agnew vote." In order to facilitate such an undertaking, we propose to utilize Pearson's Correlation and Multiple Regression statistics. As previously mentioned, selected variables include: (a) percent vote for

Wallace (b) percent black (c) median income (d) median educational level
 (e) percent blue collar (f) percent foreign stock (g) percent urban (h) per-
 cent rural (i) percent white collar

In the analysis of county candidate preference (sub-grouped into seven economic areas), we discover most significant rates of correlation between percent vote for Wallace and preference for Mahoney (a Pearson's r of .7626); secondly, a negative correlation of .4014 between percent urban and vote registered for the Democrat; thirdly, a negative correlation of .3862 between percent foreign stock and vote for Mahoney; a negative association of .3092 between median income and vote for the candidate; a negative association between median educational level and the 1966 Democratic vote of .3069; a .2976 relationship between percent black and support for the Mahoney candidacy; a positive .1632 relationship between the Mahoney vote and percent blue collar; and a negative .1632 association between percent white collar and the Democratic vote.

Such statistics indicate that 58% of the variance in the Mahoney vote "is explained" by the vote for Wallace in the 1964 Democratic Presidential Primary. Note that such evaluations are "county-by-county" and "region-by-region," i.e., all data are aggregate in nature. Sixteen percent of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent urban (yet a negative r exists here, i.e., the greater urban the area, the less vote for the

Democrat); 14% of the variance in this vote is explained by percent foreign stock (again, a negative relationship exists thus having the identical affect as the "urban" variable in its relationship with the Mahoney vote); 9% of the variance is explained by percent rural (since a positive r exists here, the greater the rural nature of the county or region, the greater the support for the Democrat; 9% of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by educational level and median income level respectively (a negative r is present). In addition, 8% of the variance is explained by percent black population. Note that due to the prominence of the open occupancy issue, a positive relationship between percent black and the vote for Mahoney possibly reflects favorable reaction by white voters to the Democrat's anti-open housing stand in those regions having a significant black population. It does not, then, indicate black support for the Democrat. Two percent of the variance in the Mahoney vote is explained by percent blue collar; 2% of the variance in this particular electoral preference is explained by percent white collar (though a negative r exists, i.e., the greater the percentage of white collar workers in a region or county, the less the vote for the Democrat).

So that the following characterization of the support for Mahoney appears accurate, vis-a-vis county candidate preference. The Democratic candidate received support in those counties that (in ranking order via

significance of Pearson's r), demonstrated a support for the Wallace candidacy in 1964, had minute percentages of foreign stock within their boundaries, were characterized by lower levels of income and education, had larger proportions of a black population, and were oriented toward blue collar occupations.

In order to further address the concern of the Mahoney vote, we utilize as noted, a Multiple Regression analysis. By analyzing both the association between a given SES variable and the Mahoney vote, and the explanatory capacity of given variables, a more complete evaluation of county candidate preference factors in the 1966 Democratic vote is presented.

Regression analysis indicates that 58% of the Mahoney vote, by county, can be explained by the Wallace vote, i.e., those counties that indicated significant support for Wallace in 1964, illustrated support for Mahoney in 1966. Sixty-three percent of the Democratic vote in 1966 can be explained from knowledge of both the Wallace vote and percent black in given counties (percent black accounts for an increase in explanatory capacity of 5%). The percent Wallace vote, percent black, and percent foreign stock account for an increase to 65% in explanatory capacity (percent foreign stock accounting for the increase of 2%). A consideration of the Wallace vote, percent black, percent foreign stock, and percent white collar enables our explanatory ability to increase to 73% concerning the Mahoney vote (the variable "white

collar occupation" increases the ability to explain the Democratic vote by 8%). The addition of the variable, "median educational level," given our above stated variables, explains 74% of the Mahoney vote (this latter variable increases the rate of explanation by 1%). (Rate of explanatory change as we utilize the phrase, is referred to statistically as "R Square Change.") The addition of percent rural accounts for an R Square Change of less than 1% (therefore the explanation level for the Mahoney vote remains approximately 74%. Given our previously stated variables in this analysis, percent urban accounts for an R Square Change of 1% and a total explanatory capacity of 75%. The last variable, median income, increases one's ability to explain the Mahoney vote by less than 1% (an R Square Change of .00027). In total, then, 75% of the Mahoney vote can be explained given our selected variables in quantitative analysis. So that in attempting to account for the Democratic vote in 1966, judging by the statistic R Square Change, five, key explanative variables are (1) percent vote for Wallace (2) percent white collar (3) percent black (4) percent foreign stock (5) median educational level.

In order to analyze, what may be termed "the Agnew vote," the identical statistical technique is utilized. Thirty-six percent of the variance in the Republican vote is explained by median educational level; 31% of the variance in this particular vote is explained by the percent vote for Wallace (where a negative r exists), indicating the greater the support for

Wallace among certain counties in 1964, the less support for Agnew in these same counties in 1966. Twenty-seven percent of the variance in the Republican's vote is explained by the percent foreign stock; 19% of such variance is explained by percent white collar, 19% of the variance in the GOP vote is explained by percent blue collar (a negative r exists in this latter case). Eighteen percent of the variance in the Agnew vote is accounted for by the percent black in a given county (again, a negative r is recorded). (In analyzing this particular relationship, as we stated in the discussion of the Mahoney vote, a significant percentage of blacks in a given area is cause for favorable white reaction to Mahoney's anti-open occupancy policy.) Likewise, the less the percentage of blacks, e.g., Republican Western Maryland (.06% black), the less favorable or less relevant the Democrat's position on this issue tends to be.

The degree to which a given county is rural or urban each accounts for 17% of the variance in the Agnew vote, with the former variable expressed in terms of a negative r . So that the Agnew vote is comprised of support in the urban areas; characterized further by higher income and higher educational level regions; such regions have high concentrations of foreign stock, are less populated by blacks, and are dominated by white collar occupations. In addition, the counties supporting the Agnew candidacy in 1966 tended not to support Wallace in 1964.

Analyzing the Agnew vote in terms of Regression analysis, we discover that 36% of the Republican's vote can be explained by knowledge of median educational level. With additional consideration of the percent vote for Wallace, the explanatory capacity of our analysis extends to 49% (an R Square Change of 12% is attributed to the Wallace vote). Given the above variables "median education" and "percent vote for Wallace," percent blue collar enables us to account for 50% of the Republican's vote). Percent foreign stock accounts for an R Square Change of 4%, enabling an ability to account for 54% of the vote for this candidate. Percent rural does not significantly increase the explanatory capacity of the analysis (R Square Change is equal to .00523); so that, still, 54% of the vote is explained. Percent urban, however, enables us to account for 57% of the Agnew vote (an R Square Change of 3%), while the addition of the variable, median income, represents an R Square Change of 1% (i.e., 58% of the GOP candidate's support) can now be explained. The addition of "percent black" accounts for an R Square Change of only .00119 and therefore does not significantly increase our ability to explain support for the Agnew candidacy. Our conclusion, here, is that given a knowledge of county or regional demographic and SES characteristics, via quantitative analysis, we can accurately suspect particular county electoral behavior patterns. Such an analysis permits us, in addition, to explain 58% of the vote for Agnew (75% of the vote for Mahoney).

In sum, key explanatory variables vis-a-vis classification of "the Mahoney vote" and "the Agnew vote" appear, in rank order, as follows: Note that significance of variables in explaining candidate preference (i.e., the "rank order" we have assigned to such variables) is a function of R Square value.

Common Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)

Supportive of the Mahoney Candidacy

- 1) high concentration of the Wallace vote in the 1964 Democratic primary
- 2) low percentage of white collar occupations
- 3) high concentration of black population
- 4) low concentration of foreign stock
- 5) lower median educational levels

Common Characteristics of Counties (Statewide)

Supportive of the Agnew Candidacy

- 1) higher median educational level
- 2) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
- 3) higher concentration of foreign stock
- 4) higher percent urban
- 5) lower percent blue collar

In order to increase the accuracy of our study (which suggests that counties indicating an electoral preference for a particular candidate are characterized by certain demographic, socio-economic conditions), we propose an investigation of county candidate preference by "economic areas" as

suggested by Bogue and Beale in Economic Areas of the United States.³¹

According to this technique, the state is sub-grouped into a consideration of Western Maryland, Maryland Piedmont, Lower and Upper Eastern Shore respectively, the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, Southern Maryland, and the Washington, D.C. suburban area.

Investigation of Western Maryland (Allegany and Garrett Counties) indicates that this region supported Agnew by 52% compared to 37% for Mahoney. Given this electoral preference, key county characteristics common to our definition of the support for Agnew ought to be prevalent in this area. (In analyzing socio-economic characteristics of a given area, i.e., the classification of a region as a "blue collar area," "urbanized area," etc., the mean average of such factors on the state level is utilized as a basis for comparison.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Western Maryland)

This region voted 10% for the Wallace candidacy in 1964 compared to a state figure of 44% support for the Alabama Governor. Thus the lower concentration of the Wallace vote appears as a factor in determining what we would expect to be an electoral preference for Agnew given the statewide county analysis. Yet other characteristics common to the state, indicating a support for Agnew are not common to Western Maryland, i.e., the region contains a high percentage of blue collar workers (63% compared to a state

level of 56%) , has lower concentrations of foreign stock (3% compared to 6% for the state) , has a slightly lower median educational level (10.4 contrasted to 11 yrs. for the state as a whole) , and is considerably rural (73% compared to 60% for the state) . These are regional characteristics that at initial glance, indicate a preference for the Democrat Mahoney rather than Agnew . Yet given the fact that this area demonstrated candidate choice for the Republican, the variable "percent vote for Wallace" must be singled out for its increased significance in accounting for such electoral behavior . In addition to a consideration of factors that contribute to the support of the Republican nominee, some recognition of the absence of key SES characteristics typical of the support for Mahoney may be relevant in explaining why Western Maryland voted for Agnew . Very simply , then, candidate preference can be analyzed via a study of key demographic , SES factors that are present within a given region (thus indicating , in the case of Western Maryland , the low concentration of the Wallace vote) , as well as key factors absent that indicate possible lack of support . For example, the percent vote for Wallace was discovered as the only key variable valid in suggesting support for Agnew . Yet a key SES factor indicating support for the Mahoney candidacy is a significant number of blacks . This particular region contains a black population of less than 1% compared to the state mean of 18%--hence a factor indicative of Republican support and lack of support for the Mahoney candidacy . This appears

important in analyzing Agnew's victory over Mahoney in Western Maryland.

Investigation of the Baltimore Metropolitan Area (Anne Arundel and Baltimore Counties and Baltimore City) indicates that this region supported Mahoney by 45% and Agnew 42% (an Independent received the majority of other votes). Given this electoral preference, key area characteristics common to our definition of the Mahoney support ought to be prevalent.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Baltimore Metropolitan Area)

Analysis of this particular region is rather difficult. Common SES factors are (a) a moderate median educational level--constant with the state (b) a high concentration of foreign stock--11% compared to 6% for the state (c) a high degree of urbanization--85% compared to 36% (d) a lower percentage of blue collar occupations--47% contrasted to 56%

The presence of these factors indicate a suspicion of support for the Agnew candidacy, yet the region voted for Mahoney. Two variables, it appears, account substantially for the political behavior in this area; the percent vote for Wallace and the percent black population. A high concentration of the black population, we stated in analyzing county electoral behavior, is one cause generating support for the Mahoney candidacy. An investigation of the concentration of blacks in this region indicates that the Baltimore Metropolitan Area is 22% black compared with a rate of 18% for the entire state. In addition,

we find that 42% of this region voted for Wallace (a rate fairly constant with the state level of 44%) .

In order to further analyze this region, we must segregate Baltimore City from its two satellite counties. While the Baltimore Metropolitan Area supported Mahoney, the City did not (Agnew 47%, Mahoney 37%--again the majority of other votes to an Independent). So that a study of the Mahoney vote is facilitated given a consideration of only Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties. With this restriction, we discover a 48% rate of support for the Wallace candidacy in 1964 (compared to 44% for the state), indicating a suspicion of attraction for the Democrat Mahoney. This variable appears as the only reliable indicator of candidate choice in this region. Excluding Baltimore City, the median income and educational levels, percent white collar are all inflated while percent black, percent blue collar are deflated (yet excluding the City, this region voted for Mahoney by 48%) .

Consideration of Baltimore City indicates the following characteristics: a high percentage black population (50%), a lower median educational level (9.9 yrs.), a lower percentage of white collar occupations (45%). (All above figures are relative to the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, i.e., we are comparing Baltimore City with Baltimore and Anne Arundel Counties). In addressing characteristics of the City, initial observation suggests an electoral preference for Mahoney. However, a consideration of urban con-

centration --a factor indicating support for Agnew-- (100% compared to 78% for the region as a whole) , percent vote for Wallace (31% for the City, 42% for the region) appears to significantly account for the support demonstrated for the Agnew candidacy. Additionally, the presence of a significant black population appears to have two possible affects. As indicated previously, a substantial black populace may serve to attract favorable reaction to Mahoney's anti-open housing stand where whites are concerned. In other words, open occupancy is very much a salient or relevant issue. This analysis appears accurate, however, only where there is a significant black population, but not where blacks approach a majority, e.g., Baltimore City. In the latter case, a concentration of blacks, in negative response to Mahoney's anti-open housing position, demonstrated support for the Republican increasing the latter's chances for electoral victory.

In Baltimore City, then, the black vote assisted in off-setting the vote of those whites attracted by the Democrat's stand on integrated housing. (The presence of the "white liberal" vote, particularly in Baltimore's often-mentioned 5th District can be said to have had a similar affect on the Mahoney vote.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Piedmont Maryland)

Investigation of Piedmont Maryland (Carroll, Frederick, Harford, Howard, and Washington Counties) , indicates that this region voted for Agnew by 50% compared to 43% for Mahoney. Given this preference, key area

characteristics common to our description of the Agnew vote ought to be outstanding. However, in order to accurately analyze this region, a technique earlier referred to must be utilized, i.e., candidate preference in Piedmont Maryland must be studied via the absence of key SES factors whose presence would indicate probable support for Mahoney. Naturally, reference to the existence of SES characteristics in this region whose presence is indicative of support for Agnew is likewise essential.

Piedmont Maryland's median educational level is identical to that of the state as is its concentration of foreign stock. The region has an urban concentration of 34% (compared to 36% for the state) and a similar percent of blue collar occupations relative to the entire state. Such characteristics of the region do not compare favorably (that is to say such characteristics are not similar), with those cited as common to the Agnew vote statewide, i.e., higher median educational level (relative to the state), higher concentration of foreign stock, higher percent urban, lower percent rural, lower percent blue collar, (all figures relative to the state). In fact, the above SES factors do not permit an accurate evaluation of probable electoral behavior, in part due to the significant degree of similarity between this region and the state. In retrospect, a correct assumption might suggest that Piedmont Maryland's electoral behavior reflects that of the state in general, given identical SES characteristics. Yet we remain concerned in attempting to account for this

region's preference for Agnew. Additional investigation reveals that Piedmont Maryland voted for the candidacy of George Wallace by 32% (compared with 44% for the state), a factor which indicates probable preference for the Republican candidate. Further analysis illustrates that candidate preference in this area may be accounted for by the absence of at least one, major characteristic found to be common in areas demonstrating a support for Mahoney--the presence of a significant black population. Piedmont Maryland is but 5% black compared to 18% for the entire state. So that in addressing a single, yet important characteristic of areas supportive of the Agnew candidacy (a low concentration of the vote for Wallace) and a major factor indicative of support for Mahoney (a significant black population--which Maryland Piedmont lacks), we have accounted for two probable factors responsible for electoral behavior and the subsequent support of Spiro Agnew in this region.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Southern Maryland)

Investigation of Southern Maryland (Calvert, Charles, and St. Mary's Counties), indicates that the region voted for Mahoney by 57% compared to 41% for Agnew. An analysis of this area is not difficult as electoral behavior can be accounted for via the aforementioned, key SES characteristics common to the Mahoney vote in our statewide consideration. Southern Maryland is characterized by a high percent vote for Wallace in 1964 (53% compared to

44% for the state) , a high percent black population (29% compared to 18%) , a low concentration of foreign stock (5% compared to 6%) , and a median educational level identical to that of the entire state.

Each of these characteristics , save the latter variable where no analysis is possible, are elements common to areas supportive of the Mahoney candidacy. From an alternative perspective, an investigation of Southern Maryland reveals the absence of those factors indicative of support for the Republican, Agnew, i.e., higher median educational level, low concentration of the Wallace vote, high concentration of foreign stock, and significant urban concentration (Southern Maryland is 88% rural) .

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area)

Investigation of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area (units within Maryland include Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties) , indicates that 63% of this region voted for Agnew compared to 33% for Mahoney. This area is distinguished by a higher median educational level (14 yrs. contrasted with 11 yrs. for the state as a whole) , a lower concentration of the Wallace vote (29% compared to 44%) , a higher concentration of foreign stock (17% contrasted to 6%) , a high degree of urbanization (91% compared to 36%) , and a lower rate of blue collar occupations (28% contrasted to 56%) .

In addition, we would suspect support for the Agnew candidacy in this region due to the absence of SES and demographic factors common to areas

supportive of the Mahoney candidacy, i.e., a significant Wallace vote, low concentration of foreign stock, significant black population (the region's black population is 13% compared to 18% for the state), etc. (Reference to these SES characteristics found to be common of areas supportive of the Mahoney candidacy on a statewide level may prove useful.) Where the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area is concerned, such factors indicative of support for the Democrat, will be found to be absent.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Upper Eastern Shore Maryland)

Investigation of Upper Eastern Shore Maryland (Caroline, Cecil, Queen Anne's, Kent, and Talbot Counties), indicates that the region voted for Mahoney by 51% compared to 45% for Agnew. The area voted 53% for George Wallace in 1964 (compared with the frequently mentioned state figure of 44%), contains a black population of 21% (18% for the state), has a median income of \$8000 (compared with \$9400 for the state), a median educational level of 10 yrs. (11 yrs. for the state), is 66% blue collar (56% for the state) and 5% foreign stock populated (contrasted with 6% for the state), and 70% rural (compared with a figure of 60% for the state). These characteristics correspond to those previously mentioned as indicators of the Mahoney vote, i.e., a high concentration of the Wallace vote, low concentration of foreign stock, high concentration of blacks, etc. Additional investigation reveals the absence of those factors indicative of support for the Republican, Agnew, i.e., high

concentration of urbanization, higher level of education, higher rate of white collar occupations, etc. So that electoral preference in this region is easily accounted for.

It is noteworthy that of the five counties classified as "Upper Eastern Shore Maryland," Talbot County voted for Agnew by 51% compared to 46% for Mahoney. This particular county is distinguished by a higher median educational level (10.5 yrs. compared to 10 yrs. for the region) and is 29% urban (contrasted to an urbanization rate of 14% for this area in general), and voted 49% for Wallace compared to 53% for the region. So that when compared to other counties in the region, Talbot County assumes characteristics common to areas supportive of the Republican; yet when contrasted with the state, distinguishing traits of the Agnew vote disappear.

ANALYSIS OF VARIABLES (Lower Eastern Shore Maryland)

Investigation of Lower Eastern Shore Maryland (Dorchester, Somerset, Wicomico, and Worcester Counties) indicates that the region voted for Mahoney by 53% and Agnew by 45%. This region is distinguished by a high concentration of the Wallace vote (68%), a low percent of white collar occupations (32% versus 43% for the state), a high concentration of black population (31% compared to 18% for the state), a low percentage of foreign stock (3% contrasted to 6% for the state), and a low median educational level (9.6 yrs. compared to 11 yrs. statewide). These regional characteristics correspond

exactly to those cited earlier in our statewide analysis indicating a preference for the Democrat, Mahoney. Simultaneously, those characteristics common to areas demonstrating support for the Agnew candidacy are absent in this region. (See statewide SES factors common to those regions voting Republican.)

Noteworthy, is that a single county (Wicomico) voted 53% for Agnew and 44% for Mahoney. This particular county is featured by a lower percent black population (25% compared to 31% for the region), a higher median income level (\$8700 compared to \$7400 for the region), a higher median educational level (10.8 compared to 9.6 for the area), a higher percentage of white collar workers (36% compared to 32% for the region), and a lower concentration of the Wallace vote (62% compared to 68% for the area). Relative to region, then, SES characteristics of Wicomico County suggest a candidate preference for Agnew. Relative to the state, such factors indicate a preference for Mahoney. In short, if an attempt is made to study electoral behavior in Wicomico County (and the aforementioned case of Talbot County), then such an evaluation of political behavior is best approached relative to these counties' respective regions (i.e., Upper and Lower Eastern Shore Maryland) as opposed to the state as a whole.

A summary of findings, both statewide and by region, indicate the following characteristics of the Agnew and Mahoney support.

THE ENTIRE STATE (Agnew 50%, Mahoney 40%)³²

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy)

- a) higher median educational level
- b) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
- c) high concentration of foreign stock
- d) high percent urban
- e) lower percent blue collar

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)

- a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) low percent white collar occupations
- c) high percent black population
- d) low concentration of foreign stock
- e) lower median educational level

WESTERN MARYLAND (Agnew 52%, Mahoney 37)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy)

- a) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) lower concentration of black population
- c) other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present

PIEDMONT MARYLAND (Agnew 50%, Mahoney 43%)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy)

- a) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) lower percent black population
- c) other factors indicating support for the Republican are not present

BALTIMORE METROPOLITAN AREA (Mahoney 45%, Agnew 42%)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)

- a) high concentration of the Wallace vote (exclusive of Baltimore City)
- b) high percentage black population
- c) other factors indicating support for the Democrat are not present

SOUTHERN MARYLAND (Mahoney 57%, Agnew 41%)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)

- a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) high concentration of black population
- c) low percent foreign stock
- d) other characteristics indicating support for the Democrat are not present

WASHINGTON, D.C. SUBURBAN AREA (Agnew 63%, Mahoney 33%)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Agnew Candidacy)

- a) higher median educational level
- b) lower concentration of the Wallace vote
- c) high concentration of foreign stock
- d) high concentration of urbanization
- e) lower percent blue collar

UPPER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney 51%, Agnew 45)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)

- a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) low percent white collar occupations
- c) high percent black population
- d) low concentration of foreign stock
- e) lower median educational level

LOWER EASTERN SHORE MARYLAND (Mahoney 53%, Agnew 45)

(Characteristics Indicative of Support for the Mahoney Candidacy)

- a) high concentration of the Wallace vote
- b) low percent white collar occupations
- c) high concentration black population
- d) low concentration of foreign stock
- e) lower median educational level

Where the Mahoney vote is concerned, we make the following conclusions based upon our analysis. "Percent vote for Wallace" and "percent black" population appear as the most significant variables in a regional analysis of candidate preference. Only these variables remain constant throughout treatment of each particular area, as indicators of such electoral behavior. For example, a key indicator of support for the Democratic candidate (illustrated by our analysis of the entire state), is a lower median educational level. This characteristic was common to the Upper and Lower Eastern Shore regions, respectively (and these areas indeed voted Democratic). However, this distinguishing trait was not common with the Baltimore Metropolitan Area, where the median educational level was greater than that for the state as a whole, or Southern Maryland, where educational level was constant with the state, (yet both regions demonstrated a support for Mahoney). In addition, a low concentration of foreign stock is common to but three of four "Mahoney regions." In sum, only percent vote for Wallace and percent black remain as universal indicators of candidate preference where the Mahoney vote is concerned.

Where the Agnew vote is analyzed, the more significant variables, again, are percent vote for Wallace and percent black population. Note that percent black was not one of the five "key" variables cited in our statewide

survey of characteristics common to the Agnew vote. This variable accounted for an R Square Change of only .00119. Yet only this variable, in addition to percent vote for Wallace, remain as constant identifiers of the Agnew support.

Piedmont Maryland, for example, preferred Agnew yet this region is characterized by a lower rate of urbanization and constant rates of blue collar occupations, median education, and foreign stock (relative to the state). Investigation of statewide data reveals that a low concentration of urbanization is a factor typical of support for Mahoney. So that, as was the case concerning the support for Mahoney, only percent black and percent vote for Wallace universally account for voting preference in consideration of the Agnew candidacy.

The significance of these two particular variables (not treating other variables with disregard), has implications for the issue of open occupancy in the election. In assuming a positive association between the 1964 Wallace vote and a preference for "segregationist policy" on domestically-oriented civil rights issues, along with the positive relationship between percent black and favorable white voter reaction to the Mahoney candidacy, OPEN HOUSING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SALIENT ISSUE IN THE 1966 GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION. Reference to the initial discussion of candidate

strategies in the election (in particular, the Mahoney single-issue oriented campaign), in addition to respective organizational support, appear to advance the validity of this assertion. Thus a key factor in the determination of candidate preference was the perception of the Democrat Mahoney as an anti-open occupancy candidate and the Republican Agnew as a moderate-to-pro-open housing policy alternative.

MARYLAND COUNTIES BY "ECONOMIC AREA"

	%WALL	%BK	MINC	MEDU	%BC	%FS	%UR	%RU	%WC	%MA	%AG
<u>Western Maryland</u>											
Allegany											
Garrett	10	*	7029	10.4	63	*	26	73	36	37	52
<u>Maryland Piedmont</u>											
Carroll											
Frederick											
Harford											
Howard											
Washington	32	5	10554	11.0	55	6	34	66	45	43	50
<u>Southern Maryland</u>											
Calvert											
Charles											
St. Mary's	53	29	9128	11.0	52	5	12	88	48	57	41
<u>Upper Eastern Shore</u>											
Caroline											
Cecil											
Kent											
Queen Anne's											
Talbot	53	21	8078	10.0	66	3	14	75	34	51	45
<u>Lower Eastern Shore</u>											
Dorchester											
Somerset											
Wicomico											
Worcester	68	31	7441	9.6	67	3	24	75	32	53	45
<u>Baltimore Metropolitan</u>											
Baltimore County											
Baltimore City											
Anne Arundel	42	22	10791	11.0	47	11	85	14	52	45	42
<u>Washington, D.C. Suburban</u>											
Montgomery											
Prince Georges	29	13	14580	14.0	28	17	91	9	72	33	63

KEY... "*" designates less than 1%

%Wall...percent vote for Wallace

%BK...percent black population

MINC...median income

MEDU...median educational level

%BC...percent blue collar

%FS...percent foreign stock

%UR...percent urban

%RU...percent rural

%WC...percent white collar

%MA...percent vote for Mahoney

%AG...percent vote for Agnew

CHAPTER V

THE ISSUE STATUS OF OPEN OCCUPANCY

Chapter Five proposes to determine the "issue status" of open occupancy in the 1966 election. Simultaneously, from a theoretical perspective, the role of this issue in the determination of electoral behavior is examined.

In addressing the above questions, we concern ourselves with criticism of a central thesis presented in The People's Choice.¹ The key concept in this presentation is the "Index to Political Predisposition," i.e., evaluation of voters' SES levels, occupation, religion, and residence, in order to determine political party preference. Inherent is the belief that electoral preference is totally the result of party identification. Issues merely account for secondary political affect as they reinforce party partisanship.

Authors Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet, in support of the Index to Political Predisposition concept, address the effects of "activation," "reinforcement," and "conversion" relative to voting behavior.² The former term implies that (a) campaign propaganda arouses interest (b) increased interest accounts for increased exposure, i.e., voters become more informed; a cyclical relationship exists here (c) attention is selective in that as interest increases and the voter becomes aware of the campaign, political predispositions become significant; out of the wide array of campaign propaganda, due

to predisposition, the voter will select available information favorable to his party and reject that which is unfavorable (d) votes crystallize; electoral preference is based upon the voter's political predisposition.

The reinforcement effect refers to the suggestion that the more interested people are in the election, the more they tend to expose themselves to propaganda of their own party. The conversion effect suggests that few voters are converted to the other party via campaign propaganda, i.e., as previously implied, voters' behavior is based upon the Index to Political Predisposition.

Chief criticism of The People's Choice originates with the study's thesis which fails to recognize the possibility of a significant party cross-over phenomenon. Where the activation effect is concerned, to state that "attention is selective," and that such selection similar to electoral preference, is based upon Political Predisposition, is to theoretically dismiss the affect of a salient issue, e.g., open occupancy.

Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election indicates electoral victory for the Republican, Agnew, in a state with a 3 to 1 registered Democratic majority. Berelson, et. al., associate Republican party identification with areas of high white collar concentration, high rural concentration, and Protestant affiliation (this latter factor will not be addressed due to unreadiness of figures). In the 1966 Maryland election, quantitative analysis of the

Agnew and Mahoney votes, at initial inspection, support findings of The People's Choice. In other words, the Republican vote was distinguished by higher median income, higher median education, and white collar concentration, while the Democratic vote was characterized by lower SES level - blue collar areas. However, the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, containing the state's two most wealthy counties, and highly white collar in occupation, while voting for the Republican in 1966, is registered Democratic by a 2 to 1 margin. Furthermore, the authors attribute a significant urban concentration as an indicator of support for the Democratic party. This variable appears unreliable in predicting the 1966 vote given support registered for the Agnew and Mahoney candidacies in the Washington, D.C. and Baltimore Metropolitan areas respectively. Investigation of the black vote, traditionally Democratic since the New Deal, indicates that 70% of this group earning less than \$3000 a year voted Republican.³ The purpose of these observations is to demonstrate the validity of our assertion that electoral preference in the 1966 gubernatorial race, at least within given areas of the state, was possibly based upon reaction to the salient open occupancy issue. Such preference cannot totally be accounted for by political predisposition in this case. The Democrat, Mahoney, represented the position opposed to enforced open occupancy while the Republican, Agnew, represented a more moderate stand (as many perceived it). The activation effect, then, did not

universally determine voter preference. The Democratic party was attractive to voters opposed to open occupancy while the Republican party was the alternative presented to advocates or moderates on the issue. Voter preference was based upon this dichotomy.

Quantitative analysis of the 1966 election demonstrated, for example, an attraction for the Democrat in areas of high black concentration where a white majority existed. Such support appears to transgress degree of urban or rural concentration as indicators of the 1966 vote relative to the accuracy that knowledge of percent black population permits. We imply a definite relationship between high percent black, vote for Mahoney, and the saliency of open occupancy. The political affect of the integrated housing issue cannot be accounted for given the theoretical base of The People's Choice, where selection of candidates and exposure to campaign propaganda is solely dependent upon Political Predisposition.

It was aforementioned that the reinforcement effect incorporated the thesis that the more interested people are in the election, the more they tend to expose themselves to propaganda of their own party. The Baltimore Sun indicated that an above average 700 to 800 thousand Marylanders were expected to participate in an election where "open occupancy" had "...divided voters." (This voting figure represented 57% of the state's eligible voters compared to the 44% that participated in the 1962 governor's race).⁴ Given

a brief county analysis, it is discovered that nine traditionally Democratic counties voted Republican in 1966. Note that where these nine "defecting" counties were concerned, the mean rate of voter turnout was an incredible 65% compared to the already unusually high 57% state figure. This appears to indicate the invalid nature of the reinforcement effect (i.e., the greater the interest in an election, the greater party reinforcement), where this gubernatorial election is concerned, and simultaneously explains at least a single, major reason for the Republican victory in the election. Acceptance of the reinforcement effect does not permit an accurate evaluation of significant party defection in a high-turnout election; (this description, we claim, correctly evaluates the governor's race in 1966). Below, are listed the nine counties which crossed-over to the GOP. Both the high-turnout and defection phenomena are demonstrated.

<u>COUNTY</u>	<u>%REGISTERED (D)</u>	<u>%VOTE (D)</u>	<u>%VOTE (R)</u>	<u>%VOTER TURNOUT*</u>
Carroll	55	42	47	67
Frederick	59	41	52	65
Harford	74	42	47	70
Montgomery	65	25	71	70
Prince Georges	73	41	54	64
Talbot	64	46	51	65
Washington	59	40	56	65
Wicomico	70	44	53	63
Baltimore City	<u>83</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>59</u>

* compared to state mean of 57%

Close inspection indicates that where these particular Democratic counties are concerned, Mahoney received an average of 39% of the vote compared to an average of 53% for Agnew, the Republican; this despite the fact that these counties average 67% registered Democratic!

Another problem exists in acceptance of the Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet study, relative to the Maryland Gubernatorial Election. The reinforcement effect claims the greater one's interest in the election, the greater the support demonstrated for one's own party. Yet, as previously stated, the Washington, D.C. Standard Metropolitan Area, registered majority Democratic, voted Republican. Given this support demonstrated for the opposition party, conventional wisdom suggests that interest in this particular region would be significantly high due to the superior rates of median education and income. If such wisdom is accepted, we have a case where party cross-over, not reinforcement, occurred in an area demonstrating high interest in the election--a definite challenge to the universal acceptability of the thesis presented in The People's Choice.

Our point, again, is that the activation and reinforcement effects, as a concept of Political Predisposition, are not universally accurate in their evaluation of electoral behavior. In other words, attitudes on open occupancy determined electoral preference for a significant number of voters. Simple party identification did not totally account for such actions. The party

defection from the Democrats supports this assertion. Note that it is important to realize that we do not claim The People's Choice to be invalid in evaluating voter behavior in given elections, but only where the Maryland governor's race in 1966 is concerned (due to the saliency of open occupancy). Indeed, Political Predisposition accounted for some affect in this Maryland election also.

The validity of the conversion effect, as universally accurate in explaining voter behavior, given previous analysis, can be quickly dismissed. Key to the conversion effect thesis is that few voters are converted by campaign propaganda. This was proven not to be the case in the Maryland election as a significant party cross-over was demonstrated. A major assumption on our part is that open occupancy was given to campaign propaganda; (previous discussion of the campaigns in both the primary and general election would seem to support our stated assumption). In conclusion, with respect to The People's Choice, electoral behavior was largely based upon reaction to the open occupancy issue and not solely upon Political Predisposition. The phenomenons and occurrences cited with respect to the gubernatorial election appear to indicate this.

In consideration of the significant role assigned to open occupancy we also address the thesis presented in Voting, where only "position" issues can account for political cleavage and partisan behavior as opposed to "style"

issues that result in general consensus or non-partisan dispute.⁵ Position issues are distinguished by matters of money and material power, i.e., economic interests. Such issues have a long range time duration, result in tangible gains for the successful group in the conflict, and usually cannot be made salient by simple party propaganda. Policy on taxation is an example of a position issue. Style issues are characterized by matters of style, taste, way of life and general cultural and personal interests. This type issue involves questions of short range time duration, opposition between various racial and ethnic groups, and symbolic gratifications for successful groups in the conflict. By the above description then, open occupancy appears to be classified as a style issue. In fact, very generally, authors Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee assign style issue status to all civil rights questions. With the classification of open occupancy as a style issue we have no argument. However, we maintain that this issue definitely accounted for significant cleavage and partisan dispute in the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election. Acceptance of the Voting thesis denies the validity of this assertion. Yet previous inspection of the Democratic primary indicated sharp disagreement among the party's candidates over the open housing issue. So significant was the difference of opinion that ultimately, numerous Democrats throughout the state refused to support the party's nominee, George Mahoney, in the general election. Such lack of support for the Mahoney candidacy permitted

a Republican victory, only possible via significant defection from the Democratic party. This phenomenon, we argue, demonstrates the existence of political cleavage (via defection within the Democratic party), and partisan dispute (via the perception by some traditional Democrats that the Republican party offered the more desirable policy stance on open occupancy).

In the 1966 election, voters perceived two distinct positions on the open occupancy question. The Democrat, Mahoney, was perceived as unequivocally opposed to enforced open occupancy and where some voters were concerned, the candidate was an attractive choice due to his segregationist-oriented position. This we assume given the quantitative analysis which indicated a positive relationship between the Mahoney vote and the 1964 vote for the Wallace candidacy.

The Republican, Agnew, was perceived as an advocate of "moderate integration" (advocating open housing where new developments were concerned), but most significantly the candidate was perceived by some voters as a genuine alternative to a segregationist policy on the issue. This conclusion appears valid in consideration of the significant amount of black vote compiled by Agnew. Certainly, if the thesis associated with V.O. Key Jr.'s The Responsible Electorate⁶ is accepted, then voters rationally decided candidate (or party) preference based upon a perceived alternative presented on the open occupancy question. Note that Key views voters' actions as

"predictable and automatic responses to campaign stimuli" (i.e., voters are swayed by campaign propaganda initiated by the candidates). Yet more importantly, in explaining voter behavior, the perceptions of the behavior of the electorate held by political leaders, agitators, and activists, condition the types of appeals politicians employ as they seek popular support. Given Key's "echo chamber" thesis, such perceptions by politicians affect the nature of INPUT (public policies advocated by a party) and thereby controls OUTPUT (the citizen's vote). The people's verdict is no more selective than those alternatives presented by political officials.

Where the Maryland Gubernatorial Election of 1966 is concerned, Mahoney perceived most voters as opposed to open occupancy and popular support dependent upon the appropriate housing position. Likewise, Agnew perceived voters in favor (or at least tolerant) of open occupancy, and thus, popular sanction of his candidacy necessitated a pro-to-moderate housing policy. In both cases, the voter responded to the alternatives presented to him.

Most significantly, the argument is advanced that "voters are not fools." The electorate behaves as rationally and responsibly as can be expected, given the clarity of alternatives presented. So that faced with a choice on open housing in the Maryland Election, voters' decisions were primarily based upon policy preference vis-a-vis this civil rights question;

(indeed, input into the echo chamber did not permit significant voter behavior to be based upon any alternative issue).

As voter preference is determined by limited alternatives (initiated by politicians), such citizen behavior is likewise the result of government action and inaction. Key suggests that government activity (inactivity), is what determines prolonged support, opposition, or converts proponents into opponents or vice-versa. Whether the "switcher" (those who change party preference within two successive elections), or the "standpatter" (those who vote the same party in two successive elections) is of concern, the voter is moved in a manner that is sensible in the light of his policy wishes. Thus, many of those who voted for Mr. Mahoney (whether Democrats or Republicans), were opposed to open occupancy while those indicating a preference for Agnew, were at least tolerant on this question. (While it is implied that standpatters remain with the party (e.g. Democrats voting for Mahoney) because they adhere to party policy on an issue, Key states that some voters that tend to disagree with party stance do not switch.) In essence, the voter is concerned with what government has or has not done and what it proposes to do. With respect to the Maryland Gubernatorial Election, we suspect that voters, presented with the candidacies of Spiro Agnew and George Mahoney, were mostly concerned about what government proposed to do in relation to the prospects of open occupancy. In sum:

- a) voters are rational and , accordingly , base electoral decision upon their preference of public policy
- b) the alternatives presented on public policy in addition to the issue on which choices are offered to the voter , are determined by candidates' perceptions of political positions that possess popular appeal. (We addressed this last point in Chapter Three, where it was suggested that Mr. Mahoney's campaign strategy capitalized on the open occupancy issue) .

So that given the Key analysis of voter behavior , a policy alternative on integrated housing , and the significant party cross-over by voters , a strong case is made for the existence of political cleavage and partisan behavior over a style issue in this particular election .

Berelson , et al. , additionally comment that "when style issues come into conflict , it is only a question of deciding which candidate would realize a certain goal faster ." ⁷ Acceptance of the V.O. Key , Jr. study , i.e. , the existence of voter rationality , would appear to indicate that voters perceived some disparity on open occupancy position between the two parties . Very simply , it is suggested that the Mahoney and Agnew candidacies advocated different "ends" to the open housing question , not different "means" to achieve an identical end , as Voting would imply . If the Voting thesis is accepted , where this particular election is concerned , a belief is necessitated that the goal of achieving immediate integration (where new developments are

concerned), is similar to opposition to enforced open occupancy. We maintain that the above goals, representative of the Agnew and Mahoney candidacies respectively, were not similar in nature. Furthermore, such similarity was not perceived by voters as indicated by their electoral behavior.

In sum, while we agree that open occupancy is indeed a style issue by definition--as Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee indicate, we disagree with the assumed universal declaration that style issues cannot result in political cleavage, partisan behavior, and concern only a choice of alternative means to reach identical goals. The 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election, given the saliency of open occupancy, lends validity to our assertion.

It was initially suggested that the purpose of this chapter was to determine the "issue status" of open occupancy in the 1966 election. We additionally claimed this issue to be instrumental in accounting for voter behavior and validated the assertion, in part, by addressing shortcomings in The People's Choice and Voting. Evaluation of the role of issues relative to electoral behavior, as presented in The American Voter, lends partial support to our hypothesis.⁸

Admittedly, the key thesis of The American Voter⁹ is that party identification has a profound impact on behavior through its influence on voter attitudes. The intensity of attitude forces upon the individual are said to determine degree of partisanship. It is further suggested that due to the

complexities of politics and government, which prohibit matters from being common knowledge to voters, party affiliation supplies the individual with "cues" by which politics are evaluated. (We have claimed that the Mahoney candidacy was judged on the open occupancy issue, and not according to simple party affiliation; analysis of the party cross-over phenomenon in rejection of The People's Choice thesis addressed this matter in detail. It should be also noted, that while Mr. Mahoney lost the election, the remaining Democratic ticket was victorious.

Given the primary status of party identification, as that which determines voter behavior, Campbell et al. suggest that candidate personality is secondary where electoral decision is concerned. The political role of the candidate is described as that which is unclear as to whether certain conditions occasion the emergence of a particular individual, or the politician hastens the arrival of particular events. In any case, the candidate is viewed as the representative of his party and is judged by that label. (With respect to the political role of the candidate's personality and the Mahoney position on open occupancy, it appears as though certain conditions did occasion the emergence of the Democrat's candidacy as opposed to the alternative theory offered.

(It was stated in Chapter Three that the key to Mahoney's campaign strategy was a perception of popular support based upon a position taken on the potentially salient open occupancy issue).

As The American Voter assigns primary and secondary importance to the affect of party identification and candidate personality in the determination of voter preference, the role of "issues" is relegated to tertiary status. The authors state that most voters lack "familiarity" with issues, i.e., the electorate is not aware of a particular problem or is unable (doesn't care to) express an opinion on a matter. In this case, voters acquaint themselves with issues via information "screened" by the political party. In essence, partisan identification determines electoral preference. (Note the reinforcement effect concept associated with The People's Choice).

Yet unlike the presentations of The People's Choice and Voting, The American Voter does not dismiss the possibility of a phenomenon where a salient issue such as open occupancy can account for electoral behavior. This is our chief source of support emanating from this study. The authors suggest that several criteria must be met if an issue is to bear upon a person's vote decision. Emphasized is the fact that such criteria do not assure that an issue affects electoral behavior, but the possibility of such a phenomenon does not exist without the issue conforming to these minimal requirements. In order for an issue to affect the individual's voting decision, the following conditions must exist:

- a) the issue must be cognized in some form
- b) the issue must arouse some minimal intensity of feeling
- c) there must be some perception by voters, that one party represents the person's own position on the issue better than the other party

Investigation of the 1966 gubernatorial election suggests that open occupancy could have theoretically determined voter preference, as the issue conforms to the above requirements. We submit that voters were aware of the existence of the open housing issue and demonstrated definite opinions on it, as to cognize an issue dictates. Certainly the Mahoney candidacy itself, given the single-issue orientation of the Democrat's campaign, assisted in making open occupancy a familiar issue. Indeed, the perceived necessity of other candidates to unwillingly re-orient their campaign platforms in order to incorporate an open housing position, given the affect of the Mahoney strategy, indicates voter awareness on this issue--at least as perceived by the candidates. The authors claim that definite opinions will be expressed by voters when a state of affairs, associated with an issue, is evaluated as "good or bad," "desirable or undesirable."¹⁰ Open occupancy was perceived in this manner by voters. Analysis in Chapter One, of "reasons" why individuals preferred segregation in housing supports our claim; e.g., certain groups were considered undesirable neighbors due to perceived losses in property value, increased taxes due to necessity for increased social services, etc. Likewise, other groups indicated the desirability for open occupancy as a means to improve the possibilities of better housing.

The existence of integrated housing, then, was perceived as "good and bad," "desirable and undesirable" by various groups.

Reference to previous analysis which indicated an above average voter turnout in the 1966 election compared to the 1962 gubernatorial race demonstrates, at least, a minimal intensity of feeling. High voter turnout rates were discovered to exist within the entire state, and particularly within those traditional Democratic counties that defected to the GOP. Most significant in evaluating the voter's potential intensity of feeling is a recognition that the absolute importance of goals (or values) is not as important as the individual's perception of goals that will be realized and goals that will be hindered under alternative policies.¹¹ Given the support registered for the Mahoney candidacy, these individuals perceived the potential election of Republican Spiro Agnew as synonymous with enforced open occupancy where such legislation was opposed. Where support for the Agnew candidacy existed, among blacks for example, the Mahoney opposition to open occupancy was perceived as a thwart to the goal of integrated housing. This dichotomy, we maintain, accurately reflects the perceptions of a significant number of Maryland voters in this election. Issues such as tax reform, increased aid to education (and other issues which, in previous chapters, have been referred to as "secondary"), appeared not to have significantly produced an intensity of feeling among voters, in that values or goals

concerning these issues were not perceived as thwarted under alternative policies offered by the candidates. (See discussion of "secondary issues" in the campaign, Chapters Three and Four, where position similarity is stressed.)

Analysis of the 1966 gubernatorial election also demonstrates that voters did perceive one party to better represent their position on the issue of open occupancy, relative to the other party. It was previously stated that the significant defection from the Democratic party (most evident among nine traditionally Democratic counties), enabled the Republican, Agnew, to win the election in a state where registered Democrats outnumber Republicans, 3 to 1. For these voters who defected, the Republican party represented a policy stand on open occupancy more similar to their own, while the Mahoney candidacy was perceived as a hinder to the pursuit of established values or goals concerning the issue; again, this, we maintain was true for a significant number of voters who crossed party lines. Open occupancy indeed appears to have been the key issue upon which party defection was based as other issues in the campaign theoretically fail to conform to the requirements that necessitate at least a minimal intensity of feeling among voters. In other words, secondary campaign issues, we claim, could not have significantly accounted for party defection.

Where Democratic party identifiers did not cross-over, we suggest that a policy choice on open occupancy was similarly perceived and that voters preferred the Mahoney position; again, our claims as to voter perceptions and behavior with respect to this election, are not universal in application. Democratic voters, then, correctly perceived that the Democratic party represented their own stand on open housing better than the opposition party. The concept of voter choice on policy alternatives is key here, in that electoral behavior was based on the correct evaluation of the Mahoney candidacy and not simple Political Predisposition. Quantitative analysis demonstrated a positive association between the Mahoney vote and the Wallace vote which implies a natural attraction for the former candidate's open occupancy position given acceptance of the Alabama governor's segregationist platform in 1964. Other regions traditionally Democratic that declined to support Wallace, also did not support Mahoney two years later. In addition, those economic areas that voted for Mahoney in the general election also cast support for the candidate in the primary. Surely, electoral preference for Mahoney in the Democratic primary indicates a preference for an anti-open housing position given the single-issue orientation of the candidate and our previous analysis. Those Democrats that did not support Mahoney in the primary, for the most part, voted Republican. So that where open occupancy was concerned, voters perceived

that one party represented the person's own position on the issue better than the opposition party.

In conclusion, analysis of The American Voter thesis indicates that FOR AN EXTENSIVE NUMBER OF VOTERS, open occupancy could have determined electoral preference in the 1966 gubernatorial election. Note that the possible significance of party identification is not discounted, though we claim for it a secondary role. Our assertion appears additionally valid, given the support of the Key study and the shortcomings of The People's Choice and Voting theses.

CONCLUSION

Very simply, our thesis implies that the salient open occupancy issue accounted for a significant degree of electoral preference in the 1966 Maryland Gubernatorial Election. This conclusion has been validated by methods which served as the body of our chapter presentations.

- 1) Definite attitudes on integrated housing were found to exist among voters, and such attitudes were represented by politicians.
- 2) Verbal and quantitative analysis of candidates' campaigns and voter support with respect to the primary and general election demonstrated the significance of open occupancy in determining electoral preference.
- 3) Open housing was discovered as a possible determinant of electoral preference given the issue's compliance with minimum theoretical requirements established by The American Voter.

Note that the possible affect of party identification upon voters' choice is not denied in this election, yet we believe, given an aggregate evaluation of this thesis presentation, that the salient open occupancy issue significantly explains much of the variance in the 1966 governor's vote.

CHAPTER I

FOOTNOTES

- ¹ Nina & Claude Gruen, Low and Moderate Income Housing in the Suburbs; An Analysis for the Dayton, Ohio Region p. 39
- ² Ibid., p. 40
- ³ Ibid., p. 35
- ⁴ Ibid., p. 41
- ⁵ Ibid., p. 55
- ⁶ Ibid., p. 60
- ⁷ Ibid., p. 58
- ⁸ Ibid., p. 59
- ⁹ Ibid., p. 61
- ¹⁰ Ibid., p. 62
- ¹¹ Ibid., p. 39
- ¹² Ibid., p. 64
- ¹³ Amos Hawley & Vincent Rock (editors), Segregation in Residential Areas, p. 25
- ¹⁴ Gruen & Gruen p. 60
- ¹⁵ Hawley & Rock p. 47
- ¹⁶ Warren Miller & Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," American Political Science Review, March 1963, pgs. 45-56

¹⁷ Gruen & Gruen p. 80

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 89

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 59

²⁰ congressmans' representation of constituency is reflected via roll call analysis and simple evaluation of the representative's voting intentions

CHAPTER II

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Donald Bogue & Calvin Beale, Economic Areas of the United States, pgs. 739-749
- 2 Ibid., p. 740
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Barone, Ujifusa, & Matthews, The Almanac of American Politics, pgs. 320-336
- 5 Ibid., p. 326
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid.
- 8 Ibid.
- 9 Ibid.
- 10 Ibid.
- 11 Ibid. p. 334
- 12 Ibid., p. 335

CHAPTER III

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Richard Walsh & William Lloyd Fox (editors) , Maryland: A History, 1963-1974, pgs. 855-863
- 2 Ibid.
- 3 The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 2, 1966 p. C7
- 4 Ibid., August 17, 1966 p. C28
- 5 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1966 p. B20
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1966 p. C10
- 8 "Simple" Regression allows us to evaluate the importance of single variables in explaining candidate preference. "Multiple" Regression permits an aggregate analysis of variables in accounting for such a vote.
- 9 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1966 p. B20
- 10 The Salisbury Times, Sept. 4, 1966 p. 7
- 11 The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 3, 1966 p. C24
- 12 Walsh & Fox p. 854
- 13 The Baltimore Sun, Sept. 4, 1966 p. B20
- 14 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1966 p. C10
- 15 Ibid., Aug. 25, 1966 p. C6
- 16 Ibid., Sept. 3, 1966 p. C36

- 17 Ibid., Aug. 25, 1966 p. C6
- 18 Ibid., Sept. 4, 1966 p. B20
- 19 Ibid., Sept. 9, 1966 p. C26
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Walsh & Fox p. 856
- 22 Ibid.

CHAPTER IV

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Jim Lucas, Agnew: Profile in Conflict, p. 43
- 2 The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 27, 1966 p. C20
- 3 Ibid., Oct. 30, 1966 p. C24
- 4 Theo Lippman Jr., Spiro Agnew's America p. 76
- 5 The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 28, 1966 p. C24
- 6 Ibid., Nov. 6, 1966 p. D7
- 7 Ibid., Oct. 26, 1966 p. C26
- 8 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1966 p. C20
- 9 Ibid., Oct. 29, 1966 p. B20
- 10 Ibid., Nov. 4, 1966 p. C24
- 11 Ibid., Oct. 29, 1966 p. B20
- 12 The Salisbury Times, Oct. 24, 1966 p. 7
- 13 The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 29, 1966 p. B20
- 14 Ibid., Oct. 25, 1966 p. C6
- 15 Donald Bogue & Calvin Beale, Economic Areas of the United States, pgs. 739-747
- 16 The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 1, 1966 p. C28
- 17 Lippman p. 67

- 18 The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 29, 1966 p. B20
- 19 Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966 p. C12
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 The Cumberland Morning News, Oct. 30, 1966 p. 7
- 22 The Salisbury Times, Oct. 25, 1966 p. 8
- 23 The Baltimore Sun, Nov. 6, 1966 p. C26
- 24 Ibid., Oct. 24, 1966 p. C12
- 25 The Annapolis Evening Capital, Oct. 31, 1966 p. A10
- 26 The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 27, 1966 p. C20
- 27 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1966 p. C10
- 28 Ibid.
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 Ibid.
- 31 Bogue & Beale pgs. 739-747
- 32 Baltimore City Comptroller Hyman Pressman received 10% of the vote for governor in the election. Most of this Independent candidate's support was concentrated in Baltimore City, attributed to the "favorite-son" affect. Mr. Pressman's electoral support other than the Baltimore Metropolitan Area varied considerably below the 10% figure: Western Maryland, 10%; Maryland Piedmont, 7%; Southern Maryland, 2%; Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area, 4%; Upper Eastern Shore, 4%; Lower Eastern Shore, 2%.

CHAPTER V

FOOTNOTES

- 1 Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, The People's Choice, p. 25
- 2 Ibid., p. 73-100
- 3 Joseph Albright, What Makes Spiro Run, p. 128
- 4 Hall of Records Commission, Maryland Manual p. 502
- 5 Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, Voting, p. 184-201
- 6 V.O. Key, Jr. The Responsible Electorate pgs. 1-60
- 7 Berelson, et al.
- 8 Campbell, et al., The American Voter, pgs. 97-109
- 9 Ibid., pgs. 67-86
- 10 Ibid., p. 102
- 11 Ibid., p. 103

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